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1 General Introduction 
 
Over the past years, the public finances of many countries have experienced a reduced 
room for maneuver due to increasing deficit and debt levels. Accordingly, the German debt 
level has increased from 65.2% of GDP in 2007 to 83.2% of GDP in 2010. During the 
same period the budget surplus of 0.2% of GDP in 2007 has steadily decreased and has 
turned into a deficit of 4.3% of GDP in 2010. Generally, the public debt level may be 
reduced either by increasing taxes or by reducing public expenditures. In what follows, I 
will focus on the expenditure side of the public budget. 
A certain share of public expenditures is commonly used to finance public goods such as 
national defense, education, cultural activities, social services, or environmental protection. 
A pure public good is characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability where non-
rivalry means that an “(…) individual‟s consumption of such a good leads to no 
subtractions from any other individual‟s consumption of that good (…).” (Samuelson, 
1954) and non-excludability means that no individual can be excluded from the 
consumption of a public good.
1
 When it comes to the provision of a public good, free-
riding off others‟ contributions would be the optimal action for rational self-interested 
individuals. This is usually regarded as a justification for government intervention as a 
response to market failure and to avoid an underprovision of public goods. 
We frequently observe, however, that certain public goods are provided by nonprofit 
organizations either in addition to government provision or in place of it. The number of 
such organizations in Germany is large: For example, 580,298 associations have been 
registered in Germany in 2011 and most of them are active in the recreational sector and in 
the social sector (Vereinsstatistik, 2011). Moreover, there are more than 18,000 
foundations which have been founded under German civil law (Bundesverband Deutscher 
Stiftungen, 2011). Charitable organizations which step in the provision of public goods 
typically earn their revenues from three different sources: public subsidies, earned income 
from charges for the services they provide, and voluntary contributions.
2
 The composition 
of the revenues thereby strongly depends on the sector the organization serves. The results 
of the German part of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (JHCNP) 
showed that organizations in the sectors education, social services, and health largely 
depend on public subsidies whereas organizations involved in environmental protection 
                                                 
1
 It is important to notice that different public goods are non-rival and non-excludable to different degrees. 
2
 In the following, I will use the terms “voluntary contributions”, “charitable contributions” and “donations” 
interchangeably. 
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and cultural activities depend on donations to a greater extent (Priller and Zimmer, 2001, p. 
213). 
Priller and Sommerfeld (2009) tried to derive the annual amount of donations in Germany 
from various data sources since Germany lacks a continuous (official) reporting on 
charitable giving, whereas there are annual reports which deliver precise information on 
charitable giving in – for example – the Netherlands (Geven in Nederland), the United 
Kingdom (UK Giving), and the United States (Giving USA). The estimates of charitable 
giving in Germany by Priller and Sommerfeld (2009, p. 56) range from 2.6 to 5.2 billion 
Euros in the year 2004, depending on the data source. These numbers show that the private 
provision of public goods in the form of voluntary charitable contributions is indeed a 
considerable economic factor. Nevertheless, it seems that charitable giving in Germany is 
still comparably small. The international comparative data from the JHCNP estimated 
annual charitable giving between 1995 and 2002 to be as high as 0.13% of GDP in 
Germany, versus 1.85% in the United States and 0.84% in the United Kingdom. These 
differences may be due to the size of the public sector where larger public sectors or larger 
welfare states imply a smaller philanthropic sector (Kolm, 2006). 
 
Against the background of rising public debt levels, one might be concerned with 
increasing the private provision of public goods to unburden public finances to a certain 
extent. If, thus, charitable giving is to be promoted, it is crucial to understand the 
mechanisms behind an individual‟s decisions whether and how much to donate. In the 
standard public goods model (Becker, 1974; Warr, 1982, 1983; Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom 
et al., 1986) individual utility depends on the level of public good provision. The 
predictions derived from this model, such as free-riding behavior in large economies
3
 and 
complete crowding out of voluntary contributions by government contributions, obviously 
do not bear up against the empirical observation that individuals are ready to make 
voluntary contributions. Hence, many economists have searched to explain the 
phenomenon of charitable giving and have proposed different theoretical models.
4
 
Andreoni (1989, 1990) added the notion of warm glow to the public goods model, where 
an individual derives utility, which may be described as an inner feeling of contentment, 
from the mere act of giving. This model leads to predictions which are more consistent 
with empirical observations. Further approaches explaining charitable giving include – 
                                                 
3
 This has been shown by Andreoni (1988). 
4
 Kotzebue and Wigger (2010) offer a comprehensive review of models of donor motivation. 
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among others – reciprocity (Sugden, 1984), the longing for social approval (Holländer, 
1990) or prestige (Harbaugh, 1998), and the signaling of status (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). 
 
Why individuals make voluntary contributions and how their donation behavior is affected 
by certain incentives from outside is ultimately an empirical question. Incentives to 
increase charitable giving are set either by the government through the (income) tax system 
or by the charities themselves through the particular design of their fundraising activities.
5
 
The empirical literature has examined both the effects of tax incentives and of fundraising 
strategies on charitable giving, but it has done so mainly in the context of the United 
States. As mentioned above, the markets for charitable giving differ between Germany and 
the United States, so it is a priori not obvious that the results from earlier studies may be 
easily transferred to the German case. 
 
This thesis therefore aims at contributing additional insights on both the effects of the 
income tax system and of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving in Germany. In 
doing so, I draw on a wide range of different methodologies, namely theoretical modeling, 
regression analysis, propensity score matching, and a framed field experiment, which 
promises to deliver quite an encompassing picture of the interplay of individual charitable 
giving with taxes and fundraising in Germany. Chapters 2 and 3 thereby look at how the 
income tax system affects charitable giving, whereas chapter 4 contributes to the literature 
on the effect of information given to potential donors by fundraisers. 
 
Chapter 2 is an advancement of Borgloh (2008). It measures the income and price 
elasticities of charitable giving in Germany based on a panel of tax return data – the 
Taxpayer Panel by the German Federal Statistical Office – for the assessment periods 2001 
to 2006. Thereby it contributes to the discussion whether the tax deductibility of donations 
is treasury efficient or not, this means whether the price elasticity is larger than one in 
absolute value or not. The price of giving is measured as     where   is the marginal 
tax rate of a tax unit. This chapter is the first contribution for Germany on this issue which 
uses panel data. The advantage of panel data over cross-sectional data is that it allows 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the Taxpayer Panel covers a period 
with two statutory changes in the tax scale and thus offers greater variation in the marginal 
                                                 
5
 Kotzebue and Wigger (2008) study how the tax deductibility of donations can remedy the inefficiencies 
resulting from excessive fundraising. The consideration of the interrelation of both institutions, however, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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tax rates. The computation of the income and tax variables explicitly takes several 
particular provisions of the German Income Tax Law into account. Therefore, it is possible 
to derive very precise measures of disposable income and the price of giving. The results 
show that charitable giving in Germany seems to be income inelastic and price elastic. If 
the sample is restricted to donors only, their giving behavior is both income inelastic and 
price inelastic, but still the donors react to the tax incentive which is concluded to be 
effective. Compared to the numerous US studies, we find the income elasticity to be at the 
lower end of the range of estimates reported there and the price elasticity to be at the upper 
end. 
 
Chapter 3 is joint work with Berthold U. Wigger and looks at the relationship between the 
German church tax and charitable giving. It is motivated by the observation that religious 
giving plays a more important role in the US where no church tax exists. A simple 
household model on the interplay of donations and the church tax delivers the following 
hypotheses which are tested empirically: 
- Charitable donations of church members decrease when their church tax liability 
increases. 
- A church member, who does not donate, is more likely to resign from church when 
the church tax liability increases than a donating church member. 
- Donors are more likely to be church members than non-members. 
The two hypotheses regarding the choice of church membership are confirmed by the 
empirical analysis. The evidence on the substitutive relationship between donations and the 
church tax, however, is mixed. The regression analysis finds a small but positive 
significant relationship for all church members and no significant effect for the subsample 
of church members with precise information on the federal state of residence. The results 
from a propensity score matching approach, on the other hand, suggest a negative effect of 
the church tax liability on donations, but the assumptions underlying this approach are 
likely to be violated. Accordingly, no definite conclusion can be drawn. 
 
Chapter 4 is joint work with Astrid Dannenberg and Bodo Aretz and is an advancement of 
Borgloh et al. (2010). This chapter turns away from the income tax regulations and focuses 
on the fundraising efforts of charities. The impact philanthropy theory by Duncan (2004) 
defines an impact philanthropist as an individual that wants her donation to have a distinct 
effect on the supply of a charitable good. The theoretical prediction that the endowment of 
a charity is negatively related to the donations which an impact philanthropist gives to that 
5 
 
organization is tested in this chapter by means of a framed field experiment. Half of the 
participants from a non-student subject pool are given the choice whether to donate to a 
small or a large charity, where the size of the charity is defined in terms of its revenues. 
The subjects prefer to give to the relatively small charities, confirming the theoretical 
prediction that a charity‟s endowment affects voluntary contributions negatively. 
Interestingly, providing subjects with the information on charities‟ revenues at all has no 
effect on contribution behavior. Fundraisers may exploit this preference for small charities 
by designing their fundraising activities accordingly. 
 
Summing up, I find that charitable giving in Germany can be incentivized in various ways. 
Potential donors obviously react both to incentives set through the income tax system and 
set through the provision of information about charities. This means that charitable giving 
is not an unalterable phenomenon. Rather, if the intention is to promote charitable giving, 
it is important to understand the mechanisms underlying the individuals‟ reaction to such 
incentives. The exploration of these mechanisms seems to be a fruitful area for further 
research, also beyond this thesis. 
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2 The Price and Income Elasticities of Charitable Giving in Germany 
 
2.1 Motivation and Background 
 
In many countries, donations to charitable organizations experience a preferential income 
tax treatment. In most countries, among others Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and the United States, individual donations are tax deductible and thereby lower taxable 
income and the income tax liability. Another approach is to grant a tax credit as high as a 
certain percentage of the charitable contributions reported in the income tax return, as is 
the case in Canada, France, and Italy (Roodman and Standley, 2006). 
For many years, the literature has been concerned with an evaluation of these tax 
incentives and, hence, with answering the question whether these tax incentives are 
suitable to effectively increase charitable giving or not. Indeed, several papers have 
estimated the price and income elasticities of charitable giving in the US. The strong 
preoccupation of the empirical literature with US data and the scarcity of studies for 
countries with larger welfare states and different markets for charitable contributions, 
however, is a significant shortcoming. As we have argued before, it is a priori not clear that 
the results from US studies can be easily generalized to the German case.  
 
Several studies try to measure the influence of income and price on charitable giving by 
estimating the corresponding elasticities. While the interpretation of the income elasticity 
of charitable giving is straightforward, the idea behind the concept of the price elasticity is 
the following: In both Germany and the US, the income tax law allows for the tax 
deductibility of donations when taxable income is calculated. Hence, the deduction of 
donations from taxable income decreases the tax liability by the amount donated times the 
marginal income tax rate. For example, deducting a donation of 100 Euros decreases the 
tax liability of a taxpayer who faces a marginal tax rate of 0.3 by 30 Euros. Accordingly, 
the price of giving one monetary unit is    , with   being the marginal tax rate a tax 
unit faces. With regard to the price elasticity of charitable giving  , the interest of most 
studies lies in detecting whether giving behavior is price elastic or price inelastic, this 
means whether | |    or  | |   . When donations are tax deductible, the critical value of 
     implies that the increase in donations which is realized by the charities offsets the 
resulting loss in tax revenues for the Treasury, whereas a price elasticity      would 
then lead to an increase in charities‟ revenues which is even larger than the loss in tax 
revenues. If m is the marginal tax rate and G are the donations deducted from taxable 
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income,     is the forgone tax revenue by the government. The increase in donations is 
greater than the decrease in tax revenues if 
 
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
By further rearranging it can be shown that this leads to
6
  
 
     
 
 
  
      
      
 
When the price elasticity of charitable contributions assumes a value smaller than -1, and 
thus the loss in tax revenues is more than offset by the increase in charities‟ revenues, the 
tax deductibility of donations is said to be “treasury efficient” (Feldstein, 1975a).7 
Is his theoretical framework, Saez (2004) derives a generalization of the efficiency 
concept, saying that in the absence of crowding out of private donations by government 
contributions the subsidies to donations should be increased if the absolute value of the 
price elasticity is greater than one and decreased if the absolute value is below one. 
 
2.2 Previous Literature 
 
Just as the seminal work by Taussig (1967), most of the studies which measure the income 
and price elasticities of charitable contributions have been conducted in the context of the 
US. These need to be distinguished by the kind of data that is used. There are studies 
which use cross-sectional data and others which use time series of cross sections or panel 
data. Furthermore, some authors recur to tax return data, while others employ survey data. 
The number of surveys is so impressively high that it is impossible to quote all of them, but 
Clotfelter (1985) and Steinberg (1990) offer excellent reviews of the studies conducted 
until that time. The first surveys typically used cross-sectional data either from household 
surveys or individual tax returns whereas in later studies panel data have become 
increasingly popular. Due to the application of various econometric methods and different 
data sets, the results for the US vary widely. For cross-sectional data, income elasticities 
range from 0.02 to 3.10 and price elasticities cover values between -4.97 and 0.06. The 
                                                 
6
 See Roberts (1987). 
7
 Andreoni (2006b) gives several examples why this criterion might be imperfect. 
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results from panel studies on average deliver smaller values with income elasticities 
between 0.24 and 0.83 and price elasticities ranging from -2.98 to 0.41, indicating a lower 
reagibility of donations to changes in the tax price and to changes in income. Peloza and 
Steel (2005) use this rich data set to conduct a meta-analysis of the price elasticities of 
charitable contributions. Their results show that the use of tax-return data provides 
significantly lower price elasticities than survey data do. According to their results, the 
difference in price elasticities of high income and low income donors is not statistically 
significant. They find a weighted mean of the price elasticity of -1.44 and conclude that the 
tax deductibility of private donations in the US is treasury efficient. 
In recent years, with the greater availability of panel data the interest has moved towards 
separating transitory from permanent price elasticities. As the marginal tax rate, and thus 
the price of giving, is a function of income, the identification of separate income and price 
effects is rendered difficult if they vary simultaneously. Randolph (1995) uses a panel of 
tax returns which covers two tax reforms and accordingly offers greater exogenous 
variation in marginal tax rates. He finds a large permanent income elasticity and a small 
transitory income elasticity as well as a small permanent price elasticity (-0.51) and a large 
transitory price elasticity (-1.55). Auten et al. (2002), on the other hand, use similar data 
but a different approach and find the opposite, namely a small transitory price elasticity  
(-0.40) and a large permanent price elasticity (-1.26). Obviously, there still is no clear-cut 
evidence on the magnitude of the income and price elasticities of charitable giving in the 
US.  
To our knowledge, the most recent contribution is by Bakija and Heim (2011). They also 
use a panel of US income tax returns and include lagged and future changes in the price 
and income variables in their model in order to separate transitory variation from 
permanent variation. They find a large permanent price elasticity (-1.16) and a smaller 
transitory price elasticity (-0.85) if the variation in tax rates across the states is considered. 
The permanent price elasticity is considerably smaller when this variation only stems from 
changes in the federal tax rates. Moreover, their results suggest that individuals indeed 
adjust their giving behavior if future price changes are large and obvious. 
A few studies for countries other than the US have been conducted, such as Canada (Hood 
et al., 1977; Glenday et al., 1986), France (Fack and Landais, 2010), Russia (Brooks, 
2002), and Singapore (Chua, 1999). Again, the results are not very clear cut and cover a 
wide range of values showing very elastic as well as very inelastic reactions of charitable 
contributions to changes in price and income. 
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The empirical literature which estimates income and price elasticities of charitable giving 
for Germany is not as large as it is for the US. Paqué (1986) has been the first to conduct 
such estimations for Germany. Using times series data disaggregated by income classes to 
55 observations, he finds income and price elasticities greater than unity. Auer and 
Kalusche (2007) run a Tobit regression model on a single cross-section of tax returns. 
Their results show an income elasticity of 0.66 and a price elasticity of -1.11 for tax units 
with a total income below 200,000 DM. This income inelastic and price elastic giving 
behavior is also found for tax units with a total income greater than 200,000 DM, with 
point estimates of 0.69 and -1.05 respectively. In a recent contribution, Bönke et al. (2011) 
run censored quantile regressions on three pooled cross-sections of tax return data. They 
find that tax units which report lower amounts of charitable contributions exhibit a lower 
income elasticity than tax units giving larger amounts do. With regard to the price 
elasticity of giving, the picture is mixed: Its absolute value is greater than unity for tax 
units with low contributions and for tax units with very high contributions, whereas the 
reaction to price changes by tax units in the mid-range of the donation quantiles is 
inelastic. Taking the crowding out of charitable giving by government contributions into 
account, the authors conclude that the tax deductibility of donations in Germany is treasury 
efficient. The paper also reports the results from a Tobit model, where the point estimate of 
the income elasticity is 1.070 and the price elasticity is estimated to be -1.214. 
The results which have been obtained for Germany so far suggest that the price elasticity 
of giving is greater than unity – at least for parts of the donors – and they provide mixed 
evidence with regard to the income elasticity. This chapter proceeds upon the work by 
these authors by using a panel of tax return data which covers six years and thus offers 
more exogenous variation due to statutory changes in the tax tariff. Moreover, the use of 
panel data allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally, the participation 
and the outcome decision are modeled separately, delivering further insights into the 
drivers of giving in Germany. 
 
2.3 Charitable Giving in Germany and the United States 
 
As we have reasoned before, there is a large number of studies estimating the income and 
price elasticities of charitable giving for the US. These estimates cannot be easily 
transferred to the German case, however, because it needs to be taken into account that 
these countries differ in various characteristics. First, Germany and the US have different 
welfare state traditions: while the US has a strong tradition of the private provision of 
10 
 
public goods, Germany has a larger public sector. According to OECD data, public social 
expenditures as a share of GDP in 2007 amounted to 25.2% in Germany and to 16.2% in 
the US. 
Second, this discrepancy may be reflected in the respective national markets for charitable 
giving. The international data collected by the JHCNP indeed suggest that there is an 
enormous difference in philanthropic behavior between both countries: in the 1990s, the 
sum of all donations by individuals, business and foundations to civil society organizations 
amounted to 0.13% of GDP in Germany and to 1.01% of GDP in the US (Salamon and 
Sokolowski, 2004, p. 89). 
When looking at more recent data on individual giving, the huge difference in the giving 
markets of the two countries is confirmed. The following numbers for the year 2009 are 
taken from the Giving USA Annual Report for the US (Giving USA Foundation, 2010) and 
from the TNS Infratest Spendenmonitor survey for Germany (TNS Infratest, 2009). 
Thereby it is important to consider that the estimates of individual giving for Germany 
stem from a representative survey of 4,000 individuals whereas those for the US are taken 
from tax returns filed in 2009 plus an estimate of the donations by individuals not filing a 
tax return. Total individual giving was estimated to be 2.9 billion Euros in Germany 
between October 2008 and October 2009. In the US, however, individual giving amounted 
to US$ 227.41 billion. To adjust the numbers for the size of the respective country, one 
needs to compare these values to the respective GDP: still, individual giving in the US was 
1.61% of GDP whereas in Germany it was only 0.12% of GDP. Even if we add the 
German church tax, which summed up to 9.263 billion Euros in 2009, to individual 
donations, the share of German GDP is only 0.51%. If donations are broken down to the 
household or individual level, the average donation per household in the US was  
US$ 1,940 if non-donors are included, whereas it was only 115 Euros per capita in 
Germany for donors only. 
Third, it may be that the enormous differences in religiosity between the two countries 
partly account for the difference in charitable giving. According to the 2006 data of the 
World Values Survey, 72.1% of all surveyed individuals in the US coin themselves a 
“religious person” while the corresponding share in Germany is 42.9%. This difference is 
also mirrored in the frequency of attendance of religious services. In the US, 36.0% 
indicate that they attend religious services at least once a week whereas in Germany 8.1% 
do so. However, the literature on the interrelation of charitable giving and religiosity (e.g. 
Eckel and Grossman, 2004; Brown and Ferris, 2007; Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008), or 
11 
 
prosocial behavior in general (Saroglou et al., 2005; Tan, 2006), does not deliver clear-cut 
evidence on whether religiosity affects charitable giving or not. 
Hence, the two countries under scrutiny differ not only in their welfare state tradition but 
also with regard to their markets for charitable giving and the religiosity of individuals 
which makes a good cause for studying whether there are any considerable differences in 
the price and income elasticities of charitable giving. 
 
2.4 The Institutional Setting in Germany 
 
Before examining the effects of the tax deductibility of charitable contributions on giving 
behavior, the institutional setting in Germany needs to be described. The focus is on the 
German Income Tax Law (ITL) and its provisions regarding the tax treatment of charitable 
contributions. As the data set covers the assessment periods from 2001 to 2006, the 
following section displays the tax regulations which were valid at this time and does not 
enlarge upon the current situation. 
 
2.4.1 The German Income Tax Law (ITL) 
 
In Germany, the income of all tax units that file an income tax return is taxed according to 
the ITL. The simplified scheme for the calculation of the income tax liability is as follows: 
 
Income from seven different categories
8
 
       =   Overall income 
        -   Reliefs for the elderly, single parents, and farmers 
       =   Total income 
        -   Loss deduction 
        -   Special personal deductions (including charitable giving) 
        -   Extraordinary personal expenses 
       =   Income 
        -   Personal allowances 
       =   Taxable income
9
 
 
                                                 
8
 This includes income from agriculture and forestry, income from trade or business, self-employment 
income, income from employment, income from capital investments, rental income, and other income. 
9
 We translated the terms from the ITL as follows: Summe der Einkünfte = overall income, Gesamtbetrag der 
Einkünfte = total income, Einkommen = income, zu versteuerndes Einkommen = taxable income. 
12 
 
The tax rate which is applied to taxable income is derived from the income tax scale. The 
income tax liability is obtained by applying the tax rate, subtracting various tax reductions, 
and considering add backs. 
 
The German income tax scale is progressive, which means that the average tax rate 
increases with taxable income. Taxable incomes below a certain threshold face a tax 
liability of zero. Beyond this threshold, two linear-progressive zones with increasing 
marginal tax rates follow, whereas the income shares above the upper threshold underlie 
the maximum marginal tax rate. The tax scale for the assessment periods 2001 to 2003 is 
basically the same, but it was significantly modified in 2004 and 2005. The illustration of 
the marginal tax rates in the case of single assessment (Figure 1) shows that these have 
decreased over time for all income classes, but the changes in marginal tax rates have been 
most pronounced for the upper income classes. From 2001 to 2003, the top marginal tax 
rate was 48.5% and it decreased to 45% in 2004 and further to 42% in 2005 and 2006. 
 
Figure 1: Marginal income tax rates in Germany 2001 to 2006, in case of single 
assessment 
Source: Own calculations. 
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To promote married couples and families, the ITL provides the possibility of joint 
assessment, meaning that a couple pays twice the income tax which would be due on half 
its aggregated taxable income: 
              (
  
 
) 
 
where   is the income tax liability and    is the taxable income of a tax unit. 
Accordingly, the amount of income which is freed from income tax is twice as high as in 
the case of single assessment as is the limit above which the top marginal tax rate applies. 
Due to the tax progression, the savings in tax payments are greater the more diverse the 
incomes of husband and wife are.  
Furthermore, the German tax law contains two regulations which increase an individual‟s 
effective tax burden: First, the payment of a solidarity surcharge as high as 5.5% of income 
tax payments (under the consideration of child allowances, see section 2.7.1) is obligatory 
for every tax unit whose income tax liability exceeds a certain limit. The main reason for 
the introduction of this extra charge in 1991 was the cost of the German reunification. All 
revenues which stem from the solidarity surcharge go to the Federal Government and are 
not earmarked. Second, in Germany for some religious communities which are recognized 
as public corporations the state collects the church tax from the communities‟ members. 
Due to its complexity, we defer a detailed treatment of the German church tax to chapter 3. 
The solidarity surcharge, however, is taken into account when determining the price and 
income variables. 
 
2.4.2 The Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Germany 
 
In Germany, private contributions to charities fall into the category of expenses for tax-
privileged purposes according to §10b of the ITL. The beneficiary needs to be either a 
domestic public corporation or a charitable corporation. These expenses are tax-deductible 
in the assessment period they have been made and include both private donations and 
membership fees. Membership fees, however, are not deductible if they are paid to 
organizations which predominantly perform services for their members or organize leisure 
activities, such as sports clubs, certain cultural clubs, and local history clubs. In the 
following, when referring to “donations” or “contributions” which are declared in an 
income tax return, we subsume both deductible donations and membership fees under 
these terms. When assessing the income tax, these contributions – as well as further special 
14 
 
expenses – may be deducted from the gross amount of income, which results in a reduction 
of taxable income and thereby in a lower income tax liability. 
Until 2006
10
, donations were tax-deductible if they were given to benevolent, 
ecclesiastical, religious, scientific or “particularly eligible” charitable purposes up to an 
amount of five percent of gross income.
11
 For donations to benevolent, scientific and 
“particularly eligible” cultural purposes the upper limit of deductibility increased by 
additional five percentage points to ten percent of gross income. Beyond that amount, the 
German ITL provided the opportunity to deduct donations to foundations up to a sum of 
20,450 Euros and to deduct contributions to newly founded foundations up to an amount of 
307,000 Euros. In the latter case, a carry-forward has been possible for up to nine years. 
It is important to notice that in the following we exclude all donations and fees paid to 
political organizations because the ITL treats them differently: contributions to political 
parties and voters‟ unions generally lower the income tax liability through tax rebates, so 
the degree of tax relief is independent from the marginal tax rate. According to §34g ITL, 
the tax rebate amounts to 50% of the contributions to political parties and voters‟ unions, 
but the maximum rebate is 825 Euros in case of single assessment and 1,650 Euros in case 
of joint assessment.
12
 If the contributions to political parties exceed this limit, they may be 
deducted from gross income up to an amount of 1,650 Euros in case of single assessment 
and up to 3,300 Euros in case of joint assessment. Aside from the different tax treatment, 
there is no general agreement whether donations to organizations which principally aim at 
assisting their candidates to secure their political function should be recognized as 
charitable. 
 
2.5 The Data 
 
For the following analysis we employ the 0.5%-sample of the German Taxpayer Panel by 
the German Federal Statistical Office (FSO). The Taxpayer Panel which is derived from 
the yearly German Income Tax Statistics by the FSO currently covers six assessment 
periods from 2001 to 2006 and contains observations on nearly 32 million taxpayers of 
which 18.6 million are observed every year. To construct a panel data set, the FSO linked 
up, where possible, the observations of the single years according to the individual‟s tax 
                                                 
10
 In 2007, a law which was intended to promote civic involvement came into force. It also contained some 
new regulations regarding the tax treatment of charitable contributions. As our data set only covers the years 
2001 to 2006, however, we disregard these provisions. 
11
 We translated the terms from the ITL as follows: mildtätig = benevolent, gemeinnützig = charitable. 
12
 If someone has made contributions to both a political party and a voters‟ union the maximum rebate 
increases to 1,650 and 3,300 Euros respectively. 
15 
 
identification number. The tax identification number, however, could change due to 
marriage, divorce, or relocation from one federal state to another; hence, further individual 
identifiers were used to match the cross-sectional observations (Kriete-Dodds and 
Vorgrimler, 2007).
13
 Persons that could not be easily linked up are typically young 
professionals or retirees because they do not regularly file an income tax return, which 
implies that the average income of the panel is higher than that of the cross-sections. It is 
important to point out that the unit of observation is the single tax return and not the single 
taxable individual. If married couples choose the option of joint assessment, they get the 
identical tax identification number and are therefore considered as one observation, so in 
the following the term „tax unit‟ will be used to identify the unit of observation. 
The 0.5%-sample is a factually anonymized subsample of the stratified 5%-sample of the 
Taxpayer Panel. The anonymization process leads to an exclusion of the ten tax units with 
the highest incomes for both East and West Germany and sets all dates of birth to January 
1
st
 of the respective year. The 0.5%-sample is a balanced panel and contains observations 
on around 92,900 income tax returns for each of the six assessment periods. 
Since the German ITL is very complex, the data set contains very detailed information on 
numerous income and tax variables. This allows an accurate computation of disposable 
income and marginal tax rates under consideration of the different factual positions a tax 
unit faces. From the data we can infer both the amount of donations declared in a tax unit‟s 
income tax return and the amount of donations which is regarded for tax purposes by the 
fiscal authorities, that is the amount that is tax-deductible in the end. Importantly, the data 
set does not provide any information on the charitable causes which donations go to, so we 
are not able to distinguish, for example, donations to environmental organizations from 
those to cultural activities.
14
 
The Taxpayer Panel does not only provide various income and tax variables, but it also 
contains information on several socio-demographic characteristics of the taxpayers like 
gender, marital status, age, religious affiliation, the number of children living with the 
taxpayer and the federal state of residence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 These identifiers include among others place of residence, religious affiliation, gender, and existence of 
income from a certain source. 
14
 Some  studies have shown that the income and/or price elasticities of charitable giving vary across the 
various charitable causes (Feldstein, 1975b; Reece, 1979; Backus, 2010). 
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2.6 The Methods 
 
The variable we want to explain in the following analysis, the amount of charitable 
contributions reported in a tax return, is a typical corner solution outcome: The variable is 
partly continuous and has positive probability mass at the point of zero contributions. In 
this case, estimating the effect of a certain explanatory variable on    |   by OLS is 
problematic because of the implication that the marginal effect on    |   is constant. This 
may lead to negative predicted values of  . A model frequently used to avoid this problem 
in applications on charitable giving (Duncan, 1999; Andreoni et al., 2003; Auer and 
Kalusche, 2007; Wilhelm et al., 2008; Wilhelm, 2010; Hill and Vaidyanathan, 2011) is the 
Tobit model named after Tobin (1958) which is characterized by the following latent 
variable formulation: 
 
        
            
 
where it is assumed that   |               and   is independent of  .15 
Then 
    {
   
        
     
         
    
 
 
where    denotes the lower limit or the corner solution outcome (which need not 
necessarily be equal to zero). This means that the observed outcome     equals the value of 
the latent variable if this is greater than the lower limit and the observed outcome is equal 
to the lower limit if the latent variable is below the limit. 
The latent variable    often has no meaningful interpretation16 and we are rather interested 
in the expected value of the observed contribution    |  . This is given by 
 
   |        |          |      |       
From 
     |         |          |     
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 The illustration of the Tobit model and further details on the methods we employed for regression analysis 
can be found in Wooldridge (2010). 
16
 In our context, it might be regarded as a desired charitable contribution. It could take negative values if a 
tax unit would prefer to receive donations instead of making them. 
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and 
   |             |           [
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it follows that  
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  is called the inverse Mills ratio and     is the standard normal 
distribution function. 
The partial effect of a continuous variable    on    |   is 
 
    |  
    
  (
  
 
)     
 
The value  (
  ̂
 ̂
) is the estimated probability of observing a positive amount of charitable 
contributions given  . If this adjustment factor is close to one, the marginal effect gets 
close to   . Obviously, the marginal effects on    |   need to be evaluated at certain 
values of  , and in the following we will always compute them at the mean values of 
continuous  .17 From the formulation above it becomes obvious that an estimation of the 
marginal effects by OLS would suffer from omitted variable bias, whereby the strength of 
this bias depends on the probability of observing zero outcomes. For binary explanatory 
variables the marginal effect is the change in    |   which results when the dummy 
variable changes from 0 to 1. The parameters of the Tobit model are estimated by a 
maximum likelihood approach. 
 
A limitation of the Tobit model is the implication that the decision whether to make 
charitable contributions at all and the decision how much to contribute are affected 
similarly by the explanatory variables, this means that the effects necessarily have the same 
signs. One might hypothesize, however, that, for example, having children increases the 
propensity to donate because parents might be more aware of the social needs of the 
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 The mean values of   might not correspond to any particular observation, so it might be more interesting to 
compute average marginal effects. This, however, was not possible due to technical limitations of the 
computers at the Federal Statistical Office. 
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community. On the other hand raising children is costly, so having children might be 
negatively related to the amount that is contributed. Frequently, the Heckman two-step 
sample selection model, also called the Heckit model, is applied in such cases. This model 
has been designed to deal with problems of sample selection where the potential outcome, 
for example wages of individuals that do not work, cannot be observed. However, the 
Heckit model will be poorly identified if the same set of explanatory variables is included 
in both the participation and the outcome equation because of possible multicollinearity 
between the inverse Mills ratio and the covariates (Dow and Norton, 2003). This problem 
can be attenuated by excluding variables which explain the participation decision from the 
outcome equation. Such exclusion restrictions are hard to justify in this context because we 
believe that all covariates we use to explain charitable giving are likely to affect both 
decisions. Moreover, as discussed by Dow and Norton (2003) another consideration is 
whether the interest lies in looking at potential or actual outcomes of the dependent 
variable. In our context, zero charitable contributions are true zeros and no problem of 
missing data, hence, we are interested in the actual outcome. Accordingly, we apply the 
two-part model which disregards possible sample selection bias and thus omits the inverse 
Mills ratio from the outcome equation. Summing up, to control whether the explanatory 
variables affect the participation and outcome decision differently, we estimate the two-
part model as a robustness check to the Tobit model, and we assume independence 
between both decisions conditional on a set of explanatory variables. The first stage of the 
two-part model estimates the probability of being a donor by maximum likelihood using a 
Probit model: 
 
      |        |         
 
where   is an indicator variable which equals one for all tax units that report a positive 
amount of charitable contributions and the error term in the latent variable equation is 
drawn from a standard normal distribution. The marginal effect of a continuous variable    
on the response probability      |   is 
 
      
    
          
 
The marginal effect of a binary explanatory variable is the change in the response 
probability when this variable switches from zero to one. The second stage of the two-part 
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model leads to a linear regression conditional on reporting a positive amount of charitable 
contributions 
 
   |             |       
 
under the assumption that    |        . 
 
The panel structure of our data set allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, where 
usually fixed effects and random effects models are distinguished. The central idea is that 
an individual time-invariant effect    enters the model: 
 
                
 
where the subscript   denotes the unit of observation and the subscript   denotes the time 
period. The    captures individual characteristics which do not change over time such as 
innate altruism. The linear fixed effects estimator, the within estimator, controls for this 
unobserved heterogeneity by time-demeaning of the variables: 
 
     ̅        ̅         ̅  
 
This procedure removes the individual-specific time-invariant effect    , thus the within 
estimator does not impose any restrictions on the relationship between    and    . The 
within estimator for the parameters   is the OLS estimator of the time-demeaned data. 
Obviously, this estimator exclusively uses the variation within each observation and thus 
explains why     differs from the individual mean. Generally, the drawback of this method 
is that time-invariant explanatory variables, such as gender and education, are differenced 
out of the equation as well. Hence, the identification of the effects of covariates which do 
not exhibit a sufficient amount of within variation is rendered difficult. 
The linear random effects model, on the other hand, requires that    and     are 
independent because it puts      into the composite error term             which leads 
to serial correlation of    . The random effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimator 
uses the fact that 
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and is obtained as the OLS estimator of 
 
      ̅         ̅           ̅   
 
where 
    √[
   
        
] 
 
As opposed to the fixed effects estimator, the random effects estimator subtracts only a 
certain share of the individual mean of a variable and this share depends on the variances 
of the components of the error term and the number of time periods. When     , which 
is the case for a large   and when   
  is relatively large compared to   
   random and fixed 
effects estimators yield the same results. On the other hand, if    , this is when the 
unobserved effect    is relatively small, the pooled OLS estimator would be obtained. The 
advantage of the random effects estimator over the fixed effects estimator is that time-
invariant explanatory variables may be included in the model. 
 
Combining the estimation of nonlinear models through maximum likelihood with panel 
data is somewhat more complicated. The central problem is that the    cannot be 
eliminated as easily as in a linear model. If the unobserved effects were treated as fixed 
parameters to be estimated, one would incur the “incidental parameters problem”. With 
fixed   and a growing sample size   the number of parameters grows and they cannot be 
consistently estimated.
18
 Instead, for both the Probit and the Tobit model we assume that    
and     are independent – as in the linear random effects model – and we assume 
furthermore that    |              
  . In this case,    is integrated out of the density of 
    and the parameters of interest can be estimated by maximum likelihood which allows to 
compute marginal effects. 
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 Moreover, using conditional maximum likelihood does not solve the problem. As Verbeek (2004) points 
out, it has been shown that for the Probit model (and therefore for the Tobit model, too) no sufficient statistic 
for    exists.  
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2.7 The Empirical Analysis 
 
2.7.1 Definition of the Variables of Interest 
 
Before starting with the analysis, some adjustments need to be made to the dataset. First of 
all, we exclude all tax units with inconsistent socio-demographic information across the 
years 2001 to 2006.
19
 In a second step, all observations with restricted tax liability, i.e. 
taxpayers who earn their income in Germany but live abroad, as well as observations from 
taxpayers aged below 15 are excluded. We generate the following variables for our 
analysis: 
 
Giving (G) is the sum of donations and membership fees a tax unit declared in the income 
tax return. As mentioned before, we are not able to distinguish whether the amount 
declared is a membership fee paid to a certain association or a charitable contribution. 
There may be different motives underlying the various types of contributions, but the data 
set does not allow estimating their relevance separately. Moreover, contributions to 
political parties are not included because they underlie a different tax treatment. To 
compute elasticities, we take the logarithm of the amount of donations. In about 55% of all 
tax returns no donations are declared, so five Euros are added to the donations of each tax 
unit to account for this problem. As a consequence, in our Tobit model the lower limit of 
contributions is at         and not at zero. 
 
Income (Y) is disposable after-tax income of a tax unit. As the data set only offers income 
measures which are derived from tax law, some adjustments need to be made to obtain a 
measure which better reflects the consumption possibilities of a tax unit. Here, disposable 
income is determined as follows: 
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 More precisely, the data set contains several taxpayers which are assessed separately in consecutive years 
but nevertheless change their gender. We entirely dropped these tax units from the data set because it was 
impossible to infer the correct information. 
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 Income from agriculture and forestry, trade and business, and self-employment 
+ income from employment, capital investments, rental income, and other income 
+ tax exempt gains, allowances, and tax exempt income 
+ tax-free share of pension income
20
 
+ child benefit 
- extraordinary personal expenses 
- alimony 
- income tax liability and solidarity surcharge (before donations) 
 
The term “tax exempt income” embraces the so-called Einkünfte unter 
Progressionsvorbehalt, henceforth abbreviated as PV. According to §32b ITL, earnings 
replacement benefits – such as unemployment and maternity benefits – as well as the 
income earned abroad which is not subject to income tax in Germany are not included in 
the assessment base, but they are accounted for when the average tax rate for the taxable 
income components is determined. In case that a tax unit has earned such tax exempt 
income, the income tax liability
21
 is computed as follows: 
 
  
        
     
    
 
with   = income tax liability and    = taxable income. The income tax liability is equal to 
zero if       is below the basic tax-free amount or if the taxable income is non-positive. 
Another special case to be considered is when a tax unit has earned extraordinary income 
(außerordentliche Einkünfte), henceforth abbreviated as AO. §34 ITL, paragraphs I and II, 
subsumes (inter alia) income from sales of business and indemnifications under this term. 
The income tax liability is then 
 
           * (      ⁄   )        +
    (      ⁄   )           
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 For the assessment periods 2001 and 2004, we assume the income element share of an annuity – which is 
taxable – to be 0.3. Since the taxation of annuities changed afterwards, we assume this share to be 0.5 in the 
assessment periods 2005 and 2006. 
21
 As has been explicated before, the income tax liability is obtained by applying the tax rate, subtracting 
various tax reductions, and considering add backs. To keep the illustration simple, we abstract from the tax 
reductions and add backs. 
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where           is called the “remaining taxable income” (verbleibendes zu 
versteuerndes Einkommen).
22
 
In case that         and       , the income tax liability turns out to be 
 
        ⁄     
 
If a tax unit reports both PV and AO, the formula for computing the income tax liability 
becomes: 
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Importantly, if         and a tax unit reports PV at the same time, an unambiguous 
calculation of the income tax liability is not possible (Kirchhof, 2006, p. 1297)
23
, and we 
will accordingly drop these tax units. 
 
Since the solidarity surcharge is determined as a function of a hypothetical income tax 
liability, we first need to subtract the child allowances from taxable income for its 
computation.
24
 Based on this hypothetical taxable income the hypothetical income tax 
liability      is computed. According to §4 SolzG the solidarity surcharge is case of single 
assessment (joint assessment) is: 
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 If a tax unit reports AO income, the tax authorities automatically check whether this computation is more 
favorable for the tax unit than considering the AO share of the income as “normal” taxable income. For all 
our computations, we take into account that the most favorable tax treatment is relevant for determining the 
tax liability. 
23
 The same is true if a tax unit reports AO as defined above (§34 I, II ITL) and at the same time 
extraordinary income as defined in §34 III ITL (Kirchhof, 2006, p. 1298). 
24
 This is done for every tax unit with tax-relevant children. Usually, the tax authorities undertake 
comparative calculations whether a tax unit is better off with the child benefit or with the child allowance. 
For the solidarity surcharge this is disregarded and the child allowances are subtracted in each case. 
24 
 
      Solidarity surcharge (in Euro) 
1.                     
2.                    
                       
               
(                ) 
3.              
               
           
 
Due to the tax deductibility of donations, the larger the sum of charitable contributions, the 
lower is the taxable income. To obtain an exogenous income measure, the income tax 
payments and the solidarity surcharge have been recalculated under the assumption that a 
tax unit has not made any charitable contributions. We drop all observations with non-
positive incomes in order to take the logarithm of the income measure. 
 
The tax-determined price (P) of giving is customarily defined as    , with   being the 
marginal tax rate that a tax unit faces.
25
 This is quite straightforward due to the tax 
deductibility of donations. Defined in this way, P measures the taxpayer‟s opportunity cost 
of giving in terms of forgone personal consumption. If we take the progressivity of the 
German income tax system into account, this implies that tax units earning high incomes 
face a considerably lower price of giving than low income earners do. As the marginal tax 
rate is a function of taxable income which itself depends on the amount of charitable 
contributions, we ensure the exogeneity of P by computing the so-called “first-dollar price 
of giving”. This means that we define m as the marginal tax rate relevant if no donations 
were made which is a standard procedure in the literature. To obtain the marginal tax rate, 
we apply the tax scales of the assessment periods 2001 to 2006 to taxable income plus 
deductible donations. Furthermore, as discussed before, the German ITL defines categories 
of income which are tax exempt but effectively raise average and marginal tax rates (see 
Appendix A for a detailed illustration of how marginal tax rates are calculated). Depending 
on the relative magnitude of taxable income and tax exempt income, marginal tax rates 
equal to or larger than unity may occur. Tax units facing such expropriating taxation are 
excluded from the analysis as are tax units that exhibit a combination of AO income and 
PV income which does not permit an unambiguous computation of marginal tax rates. 
Furthermore, all tax units whose donations are below the standard deduction for special 
expenses, they are called non-itemizers, are assigned a price of giving of 1. The so-called 
                                                 
25
 More precisely, we calculate the price of giving as             . See Appendix A for further details. 
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borderline itemizers, however, whose itemization status depends solely on the amount they 
donated, which means they exceed the standard deduction only due to their charitable 
contributions, are excluded from the analysis to maintain exogeneity of the price variable 
with regard to giving (Clotfelter, 1980). 
 
T stands for the time dummy variables which are to account for up- and downturns in 
giving during the observed time period. Giving in Germany may have been exceptionally 
high in the year 2002 due to the flood along the river Elbe and in 2005 due to the 
earthquake in the Indian Ocean and the following Tsunami at the end of the year 2004. 
Moreover, the Euro has been introduced as a means of payment in 2002 and according to 
the so-called “Euro Effect” it might be that people gave more in 2002 due to metric effects. 
Hence, time dummies for the years 2002 to 2006 are included, some of which should have 
a positive coefficient compared to the baseline year 2001. 
Furthermore, we include several socio-demographic variables (X) in our analyses: 
The variable gender has no clear interpretation in this context because its value complies 
with the gender of the individual which generates the “principal” income. If the tax unit is 
a married couple, this is usually the husband. Therefore, the gender variable is combined 
with the information about whether a tax unit has chosen single or joint assessment. 
Married individuals do not necessarily have to be jointly assessed but they may also opt for 
separate assessment if this is beneficial to them. Therefore, dummy variables for single 
females, single males as well as separately assessed married individuals are included in the 
analysis, whereas married couples serve as the baseline. 
With regard to religious affiliation the data distinguishes Catholics, Protestants, tax units 
belonging to other Christian denominations or being Jewish (other confession), and tax 
units having no such religious affiliation. In the analysis, a dummy variable for tax units 
being Catholic and a second one for tax units being Protestant are included. For married 
couples, the identifying information stems from the “principal” income earner.  
To account for the possible effect of increasing age on donations, several dummy variables 
are generated for tax units aged from 15 to 24, aged from 25 to 34, aged from 35 to 44, 
aged from 45 to 54, aged from 55 to 64, and aged 65 and above. Again, the identifying 
information is the age of the principal income earner if the tax unit is a jointly assessed 
couple. All age dummy variables are included in the model except the one for tax units 
aged from 45 to 54 which serves as the baseline. 
Furthermore, several dummy variables for the number of children are included. The 
respective variable in the tax return data, however, only contains information on the 
26 
 
number of tax-relevant children, i.e. children which have not turned 18 years old yet. A 
child aged 18 to 26 is also considered if it has not completed its educational career yet. The 
model includes dummy variables for having one child, two children, three children, and 
more than three children, so tax units without any children constitute the baseline. 
The information on the federal state of residence is used to construct a dummy variable for 
all tax units living in the Eastern part of Germany (including Berlin). 
 
Summing up, we define the amount of contributions reported in the tax return to be a 
function of the variables defined above: 
 
                                   
 
2.7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data screening procedures described above leave us with an unbalanced panel which 
contains 475,272 observations. All monetary values are converted into constant 2006 Euro 
values using the consumer price index by the FSO. 
The descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that our sample disposes of a relatively high 
income with an average of around 87,000 Euros. This confirms that many low income 
households do not file an income tax return at all. The share of tax units which declare a 
positive amount of charitable contributions is 45.7%, and the average amount declared is 
733 Euros including non-donors. This large average contribution is not surprising because 
grants to foundations, which have been tax deductible up to an amount of 307,000 Euros 
per year, are included. Again, this is a hint that the sample of income tax return filers used 
here is not representative of the overall German population because the average amount of 
donations which is reported in surveys is considerably lower (see chapter 2.3).  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Donations 733.40 27663.34 
Donations Dummy 0.457 0.498 
Income 87004.89 252110.10 
Price 0.761 0.206 
Eastern federal state 0.208 0.406 
Single female 0.150 0.357 
Single male 0.215 0.411 
Married, separately assessed 0.015 0.122 
Married couple 0.620 0.485 
Aged 15 to 24 0.026 0.160 
Aged 25 to 34 0.114 0.318 
Aged 35 to 44 0.256 0.436 
Aged 45 to 54 0.262 0.440 
Aged 55 to 64 0.203 0.402 
Aged 65 and above 0.139 0.346 
Catholic 0.300 0.458 
Protestant 0.298 0.457 
Other confession 0.001 0.024 
No confession 0.402 0.490 
No children 0.547 0.498 
One child 0.185 0.389 
Two children 0.193 0.395 
Three children 0.059 0.235 
More than three children 0.017 0.128 
Year 2001 0.171 0.377 
Year 2002 0.167 0.373 
Year 2003 0.169 0.375 
Year 2004 0.169 0.374 
Year 2005 0.167 0.373 
Year 2006 0.156 0.363 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. All monetary values have been converted into constant 2006 
Euros values. The information on the religious affiliation is available for only 475,023 individuals. 
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Table 2 and Table 3 take a closer look at the distribution of donations across income 
quintiles which are computed from the pooled observations. 
 
Table 2: Share of donors per income quintile 
Quintile Income in Euro Share of donors 
1 Below 21,655.88 0.155 
2 21,655.88 – 35,348.94 0.286 
3 35,348.95 – 56,990.97 0.428 
4 56,990.98 – 122,017.59 0.630 
5  Above 122,017.59 0.784 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
 
Table 3: Average and relative donation per income quintile 
Quintile Average donation 
Average giving relative 
to individual income 
1 33.66 0.0143 
2 72.86 0.0025 
3 170.00 0.0037 
4 507.81 0.0058 
5  2882.64 0.0082 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
 
 
 
Obviously, the share of tax units which declare a positive amount of donations increases 
with income. In the lowest income quintile, only 15.5% report charitable contributions 
whereas 78.4% in the highest income quintile do so. The same increase may be observed 
for the average donation declared: it rises from 33.66 Euros in the lowest quintile to 
2,882.64 Euros in the highest quintile. An interesting effect occurs when looking at 
individual donations relative to the respective individual income. The lowest income class 
gives on average 1.43% of its income to charitable causes whereas the second quintile 
gives on average 0.25% of its income. For the third to fifth quintile this share is rising 
again, leading to a U-shaped pattern of giving which is also observed in the US (James and 
Sharpe, 2007).   
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2.7.3 The Results 
 
In the following, we apply the methods described in chapter 2.6. As the descriptive 
statistics have shown, the share of non-donors in the sample is around 55%, so the corner 
solution nature of charitable giving seems to be much more prominent in the German case 
as compared to the US. We include the same explanatory variables in each model and 
depart from a random effects Tobit model with 475,023 observations (due to missing 
information on the religious affiliation for some tax units) and complement this by the 
results from a two-part model, where we estimate the linear part for the subsample of 
donors by both a random effects and a fixed effects model. 
 
The marginal effects resulting from the random effects Tobit and Probit models and the 
coefficients estimated by the linear models indicate that giving behavior is positively 
related to the income of a tax unit and is negatively related to the price of giving, which 
implies that charitable giving is a normal good (see Table 4). More precisely, if income 
increases by 1%, donations are expected to increase by 0.27% in the Tobit model, whereas 
a 1% decrease in price increases donations by around 1.7%. Thus, giving seems to be 
income inelastic and price elastic, whereby the price elasticity suggests that the tax 
deductibility of donations is treasury efficient. If we separate the decision whether to 
donate at all from the decision how much to donate, we see that the direction of the effects 
of the explanatory variables is the same for both decisions in the Probit random effects 
model and the linear random effects model, except for the one child dummy variable.  
Looking at the results for the subsample of donors, however, the treasury efficiency of the 
tax deductibility is called into question. According to the random effects model, the 
increase in charitable contributions is disproportionately low at around 0.95% if the price 
of giving decreases by 1%. The absolute price elasticity decreases further to 0.56% in the 
fixed effects model, where only the within variation of the variables is taken into account. 
The substantially higher absolute price elasticity estimated by the Tobit model underlines 
the severity of the corner solution problem in our data set. The different models estimated 
on different samples, thus, lead to different conclusions of whether the tax treatment of 
donations in Germany is treasury efficient or not. Obviously, the reaction to changes in the 
marginal tax rate is more pronounced if all tax units – whether they are donors or not –, 
and thus the corner solution problem, is taken into account, whereas among the donating 
tax units the contributed amount of donations does not react as strongly to such changes.  
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Table 4: Regression results 
 
Dependent variable: log(donations + 5) in (1), (3), (4) 
                        binary variable = 1 for donors in (2) 
 RE Tobit RE Probit  RE   FE 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(income) 0.271*** 0.124*** 0.323*** 0.126*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
log(price) -1.695*** -0.942*** -0.945*** -0.557*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.029) (0.026) 
Eastern states -0.528*** -0.214*** -0.166*** 0.113 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.091) 
single female  -0.279*** -0.121*** -0.067*** -0.360*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.056) 
single male -0.445*** -0.223*** -0.101*** -0.252*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.014) (0.022) 
married sep. ass.  -0.268*** -0.149*** -0.050* -0.240*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.028) (0.032) 
age 15-24  -0.673*** -0.318*** -0.134*** 0.047 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.033) (0.049) 
age 25-34 -0.467*** -0.239*** -0.234*** -0.087*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.024) 
age 35-44 -0.229*** -0.128*** -0.139*** -0.043*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) 
age 55-64 0.270*** 0.163*** 0.160*** -0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
age 65 + 0.570*** 0.314*** 0.363*** -0.044** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.019) 
Catholic 0.399*** 0.242*** 0.088*** -0.097*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.032) 
Protestant 0.349*** 0.204*** 0.081*** -0.079*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.027) 
one child 0.065*** 0.044*** -0.019* -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
two children 0.194*** 0.124*** 0.034*** 0.026 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) 
three children 0.331*** 0.186*** 0.183*** 0.090*** 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.027) 
> 3 children 0.462*** 0.232*** 0.340*** 0.127*** 
 (0.032) (0.017) (0.030) (0.044) 
No. observations 
sigma (a) 
sigma (u) 
rho 
475,023 
2.728 
1.626 
0.738 
475,023 
1.726 
--- 
0.749 
216,957 
1.096 
0.734 
0.690 
216,957 
1.345 
0.734 
0.770 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust errors clustered on the individual level in (3) and (4)). Time 
dummies are included in all models. Column (1) reports marginal effects on the unconditional mean of the 
dependent variable, column (2) reports marginal effects on the probability of being a donor. Marginal effects 
are evaluated at the means of explanatory variables. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
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The finding of income inelastic giving behavior, however, is also confirmed for the 
subsample of donors and therefore robust across all models. 
The parameter estimates for the socio-demographic characteristics show that tax units 
living in the Eastern part of Germany are less generous givers than those living in the 
West, whereas jointly assessed couples give more than singles do. Furthermore, tax units, 
where the principal income earner is aged below 45, report less donations compared to the 
baseline group aged between 45 and 54, and tax units older than this baseline group report 
more donations. Furthermore, being Catholic or Protestant, and having children increases 
the amount of charitable contributions. The parameter estimates for the socio-demographic 
variables in the fixed effects model differ in parts substantially from those in the other 
models. This is probably due to the small amount of within variation in these variables 
which would render the fixed effects estimates imprecise. 
 
To control whether there are any timing effects in the reporting of charitable contributions 
by the tax units in our data set, we follow Fack and Landais (2010) and Bakija and Heim 
(2011). Accordingly, we include lagged and future differences of the income and price 
variables in our model, more precisely we define 
 
                        
                          
 
                        
                          
 
We do not find any optimizing behavior of the households (see Table B1). Instead, our 
results suggest that if the income is to increase in the next assessment period, that means 
           , contributions would increase in the current period. Moreover, if the price 
of giving is going to increase in the next period, that means              , then 
donations would decrease in the current period which is not what we would expect.
26
 
Especially with regard to the price variable, it might be that individuals cannot perfectly 
foresee the changes and that they react with a delay to them. As Figure 1 shows, the 
statutory changes in marginal tax rates have been relatively small for tax units with low 
                                                 
26
 Fack and Landais (2010) cannot find any optimizing behavior for the case of France as well and report the 
same unexpected signs for their parameter estimates. 
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and middle incomes. For those tax units it would have been very difficult to foresee these 
changes correctly and optimize their behavior. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter contributes to understanding in how far tax units adjust their giving behavior 
in response to changes in their income and to changes in the price of giving. Despite the 
numerous studies that have been conducted for the US, it cannot be taken for granted that 
the insights on income and price elasticities of giving can be generalized to countries with 
large welfare states like Germany. 
The results show that the decisions whether to donate at all and how much to give are both 
positively related to income and negatively related to the price of giving. The results from 
the Tobit model deliver an income elasticity of 0.27 and the price elasticity is estimated to 
be -1.7. Accordingly, giving seems to be income inelastic and price elastic. The result for 
the price elasticity is challenged if we look at donors only although the point estimate of 
the price elasticity still is close to unity in the random effects model and decreases to -0.56 
in the fixed effects model. Since there is a large number of estimated income and price 
elasticities for the US, it is difficult to compare the results, but the estimates for Germany 
definitely fall into the range of the US estimates. Thereby, the income elasticity falls into 
the lower end of the range of values from US studies using panel data, whereas the price 
elasticity falls into the upper range if we include non-donors and estimate a Tobit model. 
This suggests that giving in Germany might be less income elastic and more price elastic 
compared to the US.  
If we compare the results to other German studies, the results from the Tobit model 
confirm the finding by Paqué (1986) and Auer and Kalusche (2007) that the tax 
deductibility of charitable contributions is treasury efficient even if a possible crowding-
out effect is not controlled for, and the same finding by Bönke et al. (2011) who control for 
crowding-out. Our point estimate for the price elasticity, however, is higher than the cross-
section Tobit estimates by Auer and Kalusche (2007) and Bönke et al. (2011). Their 
studies differ in many aspects from our approach, in that they use different data sets and 
use different model specifications. Moreover, Auer and Kalusche (2007) exclude all non-
itemizers from their analysis. With the appropriate caution, our results for the subsample of 
donors may be compared to the quantile regression estimates by Bönke et al. (2011) 
because their procedure effectively estimates elasticities for donors only. For mid-range 
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donors, this means for the majority of tax units reporting donations, they find price 
elasticities below unity and similar to the ones we obtain in the linear models. 
Our results suggest that the tax treatment of charitable contributions is treasury efficient if 
we take non-donors into account. If we evaluate the results based on this (simple) standard, 
this would mean that the loss in tax revenue by the government is more than offset by the 
increase in donations. For the subsample of donors this efficiency result does not hold, but 
nevertheless they obviously react to this tax incentive even if this reaction is not elastic. 
Therefore, we conclude that the tax deduction is effective in promoting charitable 
contributions. Abolishing the tax incentive might considerably decrease private voluntary 
contributions and, thus, increase the need for the public provision of certain charitable 
goods. The case for maintaining this tax deduction is even stronger if the private provision 
of public goods is more effective than the public provision. 
There are, however, some limits to this study which must be left to further research. First, 
we cannot distinguish the various charitable causes donations go to, for example 
environmental groups, cultural activities, and social services. Therefore we assume that all 
types of donations react in an identical manner to changes in income and price which is not 
necessarily the case. Second, by using tax return data we eliminate those individuals with 
very low incomes and may not come to any conclusions regarding their giving behavior. 
So, the results obtained here are only predictive of the giving behavior of the particular tax 
units in the sample and should not be improvidently translated to the German population in 
general. Third, we cannot find any optimizing behavior of the tax units with regard to 
anticipated changes in income and price of giving. With longer and possibly more balanced 
panel data, distinguishing transitory and permanent price elasticities is a promising project 
for future research. 
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3 On the Impact of the German Church Tax on Private Charitable Contributions 
 
3.1 Motivation and Background 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the markets for charitable giving in Germany and 
the US are very different. This is not only the case with regard to overall charitable 
contributions, but there is also a notable difference in religious giving in the two countries. 
According to the TNS Infratest Spendenmonitor, 24% of all German individual donors 
gave to religious causes in 2009 while disabled care and child welfare are the causes 
chosen most frequently (TNS Infratest, 2009). In the US, on the other hand, religion 
received more than a third of all charitable giving which is the largest share among all 
charitable causes (Giving USA Foundation, 2010). Even if these numbers are not directly 
comparable, it seems that religious giving is more prominent in the US as compared to 
Germany.  
One possible reason for this difference in religious giving is the German church tax which 
has to be paid by all Catholics and Protestants and by the members of some Jewish and 
free religious communities if the individual is liable to income tax. The reasoning is that 
the church tax payments may be regarded as a substitute for (religious) giving, even more 
so because a small share of the church tax revenues goes to educational institutions and to 
social services. To our knowledge, the relationship of the church tax and charitable 
contributions has not been examined empirically yet, and this chapter offers some first 
insights. Thereby, we treat the church tax payments as a voluntary contribution to religious 
causes. 
There are only very few studies which look at the relationship of religious giving and 
secular giving. A survey by the Independent Sector (2002) revealed that religious givers 
are more generous than nonreligious givers. Religious givers are those that contribute to 
religious congregations, such as churches, temples, and mosques as opposed to secular 
organizations. Interestingly, donors who give to both religious congregations and secular 
organizations make higher donations to secular organizations than those who give only to 
secular organizations. This means that giving to religious causes does not interfere 
negatively with financial support to other nonprofit organizations. Using survey data from 
the US, Wilhelm (2010) confirms this result for contributions to organizations that help 
people in need, finding positive associations between religious giving and giving to these 
organizations. Hill and Vaidyanathan (2011) use the same data set as Wilhelm (2010) and 
find that religious giving and secular giving are positively related. This symbiotic 
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relationship – as the authors put it – also occurs if giving to different secular causes, 
namely helping the needy, education, and health, is separately regressed on religious 
giving. If we translate the results from these previous studies to our setting, this suggests 
that a positive effect of the German church tax on charitable contributions may prevail. It is 
not obvious, however, that these results might be easily transferred to the German case 
because the church tax is a very specific institution whose mechanisms need to be 
explored. One advantage of estimating the effect of the church tax on charitable giving 
over estimating the effect of religious giving on secular giving is that the problem of 
reverse causality should play a minor role because the church tax liability is given 
exogenously for church members. 
 
3.2 The German Church Tax 
 
A church tax system can be found only in very few countries as religious communities‟ 
revenues usually stem from other sources. Indeed, there are many different ways in which 
churches are financed: 
 
- For example, in the US and in France the churches rely on voluntary 
contributions. 
- In Belgium, Norway, and Greece the churches are basically funded by the state. 
- The church in Great Britain relies on the return on its assets. 
- Independently of being a church member or not, in Italy and Spain each 
taxpayer may choose whether to give a certain share of the income tax to a 
church or to other charitable causes. Similarly, taxpayers in Iceland are free to 
direct their church tax payments to one of the officially recognized religious 
communities. The payments of taxpayers who do not belong to one of these 
communities are forwarded to the University of Iceland.  
- In Austria, members of the Catholic and Protestant churches are obliged to 
make a contribution (i.e. a certain share of their taxable income) which is 
collected by the churches themselves. 
- In Denmark, Finland and Sweden members of the respective state churches are 
obliged to pay church tax, but the tax rate is determined by the respective 
municipality.
27
 
                                                 
27
 In Switzerland, a church tax is raised in several cantons, but the regulations differ between them. 
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According to the German Constitution, religious communities which are recognized as 
public law corporations are entitled to raise church tax from their members. The Church 
Tax Laws of the sixteen federal states provide the guidelines which are complemented and 
further specified by the decrees of the religious communities. The federal structure of 
Germany thus leads to sixteen distinct church tax regulations which differ in various 
aspects. Tables D1 to D16 display the regulations which were in force in each of the 
sixteen states in the years 2001 to 2006.
28
 
The church tax from income is computed and collected by the tax authorities when 
assessing a taxpayer‟s income tax and then forwarded to the respective religious 
community.
29
 In all federal states, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church make use 
of the opportunity to have the tax collected by the tax authorities, and in some states the 
Jewish Communities and some free religious communities do so. For members of these 
churches and religious communities, the payment of the tax is obligatory and the only 
possibility to avoid it is to leave the community officially. 
The church tax from income amounts to 8% (in the federal states of Bavaria and Baden-
Wuerttemberg) or 9% (in all other federal states) of the so-called fictitious income tax 
liability. The computation of this fictitious income tax liability is based on a fictitious 
taxable income concept. The fictitious taxable income is equal to usual taxable income less 
child allowances and under disregard of the shareholder-relief system.
30
 The application of 
the income tax scale to this fictitious taxable income delivers the fictitious income tax. 
However, there are some further provisions which differ between the federal states and 
which eventually determine the church tax liability: Some religious communities limit the 
church tax liability to a certain share of the fictitious taxable income, for example in Berlin 
the church tax is limited to 3 % of the fictitious taxable income. In some federal states the 
consideration of this upper limit is guaranteed ex officio whereas in the other states the 
taxpayer needs to send a request to the respective religious community. Furthermore, some 
religious communities demand that each member pays a minimum amount of church tax 
which is 3.60 Euros per year in most states. This minimum amount is to be paid only if the 
fictitious income tax was greater than zero. 
                                                 
28
 As our data set covers the years 2001 to 2006, we display the tax regulations that were valid at this time 
and do not enlarge upon the current situation. 
29
 The federal state of Bavaria is the only exemption. Here, the so-called “church tax offices” collect the 
church tax, so it is not administered by the tax authorities. 
30
 From 2001 to 2008, the German income tax law stipulated that 50% of the income from shareholdings in 
corporations (= “partial exempt income”) would be exempt from income tax (= “shareholder-relief”). For the 
computation of the church tax liability, however, this exempt part of the income is added to taxable income 
and thus taken into account. 
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The church tax payments of individuals that are individually assessed as well as the church 
tax payments of married couples which are jointly assessed and where husband and wife 
are members of the same religious community are easily calculated and fully benefit the 
respective religious community. The computation of the church tax liability is more 
complex, however, for couples with different religious affiliations. A marriage is called 
“inter-denominational” if husband and wife have different religious affiliations (e.g. 
Catholic husband and Protestant wife, Protestant husband and Jewish wife) and both 
religious communities raise church tax in the federal state the couple lives in. This is 
different from the case of “interreligious” marriages where one partner is subject to church 
tax in the federal state the couple lives in and the other partner is not. See Appendix D for 
more detailed information on the computation of the church tax liability in case of joint 
assessment. 
 
Table 5: Church fee in interreligious marriage 
Fictitious taxable income in Euros Church fee in Euros 
30,000 – 37,499 96 
37,500 – 49,999 156 
50,000 – 62,499 276 
62,500 – 74,999 396 
75,000 – 87,499 540 
87,500 – 99,999 696 
100,000 – 124,999 840 
125,000 – 149,999 1,200 
150,000 – 174,999 1,560 
175,000 – 199,999 1,860 
200,000 – 249,999 2,220 
250,000 – 299,999 2,940 
300,000 and more 3,600 
This table displays the regulation valid in the years 2002 to 2006. In 2001, the Deutsche Mark was still the 
means of payment. How the church fee was determined in that year is shown in Table D19 in the appendix. 
 
Moreover, in the case of an interreligious marriage, a comparative calculation between the 
church tax liability and the church fee in interreligious marriage is conducted whereby the 
higher amount of both is to be paid. The intention is that the income of the partner without 
church tax liability should not be drawn on when assessing the church tax liability of the 
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partner who actually is obliged to pay church tax. The fictitious taxable income of the 
couple (i.e. less child allowances and under consideration of partial exempt income) is the 
assessment base of the church fee in interreligious marriage which is determined as can be 
seen in Table 5. 
Church tax payments are regarded as a special expense and may be deducted from taxable 
income. 
 
3.3 The Model 
 
In this section we establish a simple household model in order to identify some of the 
determinants that we are convinced to shape the interplay between charitable donations and 
church tax liabilities. The model relies on the assumption that households rationally decide 
on how much to donate and on whether being a church member and as such liable to a 
church tax or not being a church member. We assume that being a church member 
impinges in two ways on individual utility. First, households derive a direct benefit 
(possibly negative) from being a church member. We do not rationalize where this benefit 
might come from. Rather, we take the direct benefit of church membership as given and 
consider it as an exogenous parameter in the model. Second, households perceive the 
church tax liability as a contribution similar to a charitable donation.
31
 This is because 
being a church member and, thus, being liable to a church tax is voluntary. In contrast to 
other charitable donations, however, the exact amount of the church tax liability is not at 
the discretion of the household. 
Consider a household with a utility function of the form 
 
        {
                                                  
                                                                        
 
 
where   denotes the amount of private consumption and   the household‟s contribution to 
charitable causes. The utility parameter   measures the benefit the household (directly) 
derives from church membership. We assume that         , that is, the household 
may either derive a positive or a negative benefit from being a church member. The 
functions   and   are assumed to be strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. 
The function   satisfies        , implying that private consumption   is essential. In 
                                                 
31
 See, for example, Iannaccone (1998) for a discussion on the economic role of churches. 
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contrast, for the function   we assume that       is finite. This allows for the possibility 
that the household chooses not to make any donations to a charitable cause. 
Church members pay a church tax amounting to  , whereas non-members face no church 
tax liabilities. Since church membership is voluntary, church members perceive the church 
tax   as a contribution to a charitable cause. Therefore, total charitable giving of a church 
member amounts to      , where   measures charitable giving other than the church 
tax liability. Total charitable giving of a non-member, on the other hand, simply reads 
   . 
The household‟s budget constraint is given by 
 
   {
                              
                                                        
 
 
Here,   is the disposable income of the household and   is the tax-determined price of 
both the tax liability   and other charitable giving  . The tax-determined price   is 
normally smaller than 1. This is because both, the church tax liability and charitable 
donations are tax deductible so that the household only gives away     currency units 
when contributing an additional currency unit to a charitable cause, with   being the 
household‟s marginal income tax rate. Like the church tax liability  , we treat the tax-
determined price   as exogenously given to the household, although the tax-determined 
price generally varies with taxable income. The reason is that in the subsequent empirical 
analysis we treat both, the church tax liability   and the tax-determined price   as 
independent variables that impinge on the amount of charitable giving  . Section 3.4.1 
elaborates on how   is implemented as exogenous variable in the empirical study. 
The household maximizes utility   by choice of church (non-)membership and donations 
 . Consider first the choice of  , given church (non-)membership. The first order 
condition for maximum utility with respect to   reads 
 
          
       ,   with    if     ,  (1) 
 
where       denotes church membership and non-membership, respectively. For      
the first order condition implies a function              with 
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Equation (2a) embodies the standard result that charitable giving increases with disposable 
income. Technically, this result is due to the fact that the additive separability of the utility 
function guarantees that charitable giving is a non-inferior good. Equation (2b) states that 
donations decrease when the tax-determined price of giving increases. This result is also 
standard and has been demonstrated in chapter 2. Generally, an increase in the price 
triggers both an income effect and a substitution effect. However, since charitable giving is 
a non-inferior good both the income effect and the substitution effect have the same sign, 
so that an increase in the price unambiguously decreases donations.  Equation (2c) is about 
the interplay between the church tax liability and donations. While a non-church member‟s 
donations are not affected by an increase in the church tax liability, a church member fully 
neutralizes a higher church tax liability by reducing donations to other charitable causes. 
This result leads us to our first hypothesis on the interplay between church tax liabilities 
and charitable donations. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Charitable donations of church members decrease, when their church tax 
liability increases. 
 
Consider next the maximum household utility of church members and non-members.  
Substituting for utility maximizing donations    as implicitly defined by condition (1) in 
the utility function   yields the indirect utility function of church members and non-
members as 
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As a utility maximizer, the household will choose to be a church member if      , and a 
non-member otherwise. If a church member, the household is affected by an increase in the 
church tax liability as follows 
 
   
  
  {
                                                                
          
                         
 
 
Thus, as a church member the household only suffers a utility loss from an increase in the 
church tax liability if she does not donate to charitable causes in addition to her church tax 
liability. The intuition underlying this result is simple. A church member neutralizes the 
effect of an increase in the church tax liability by reducing donations in the same amount. 
The increase in the church tax liability does not affect the total amount she wants to 
contribute to charitable causes including the church. In contrast, a church member who 
does not donate, generally contributes more to a charitable cause in the form of the church 
tax liability than she regards to be optimal. If the church tax liability increases, she is urged 
to contribute an even higher amount than the one she already regards to be too high. As a 
consequence, an increase in the church tax liability makes a non-donating church member 
worse off. Since a non-member is generally not affected by an increase in the church tax 
liability, its effect on a church member has a straightforward empirically testable 
implication. We formulate this implication as our second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  A church member, who does not donate, is more likely to resign from 
church when the church tax liability increases than a church member who does donate. 
 
Consider next the conditions that determine whether a household is a church member or 
not and whether a household is a donor or not. Consider first a household with    , that 
is, a household who derives a negative direct benefit from church membership. Such a 
household will not opt for church membership irrespective of the size of the church tax 
liability. Whether the household donates or not only depends on her disposable income   
and the tax-determined price of giving  . Generally, the household will be a donor, if her 
disposable income is high and/or the price of giving is low. 
More interesting and more involved is the case    , that is, the case in which the 
household derives a positive direct utility form church membership. For     we have to 
distinguish between four types of households, namely, a church member who donates to a 
charitable cause in addition to the church tax liability, a church member who does not 
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donate, a non-member who donates, and a non-member who does not donate. We 
distinguish between these four types in the      -space, that is, in the church tax liability-
disposable income-space. Based on the conditions that determine optimal charitable giving 
and church membership we construct  - -loci that separate the four types from one 
another.  
We start with the  - -locus that separates donating non-members from non-donating non-
members (the derivations of the properties of all the loci are relegated to Appendix C). 
Considering condition (1), this locus, denoted as Locus I, is implicitly defined by 
 
                                                            
 
Locus I is a horizontal line in the      -space, with a positive intercept with the  -axis. 
Above Locus I, non-members donate, and below Locus I, non-members do not donate. In 
Figure 2, Locus I is only plotted for larger church tax liabilities. This is because for a given 
disposable income  , non-donating households will be church members if the church tax 
liability is low. As a consequence, Locus I does not separate non-donating non-members 
from donating non-members for low church tax liabilities. 
The second locus, denoted as Locus II, separates donating church members from non-
donating church members. Considering condition (1), it is implicitly defined by 
 
                                                       
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, Locus II is an increasing curve in the      -space with the same 
intercept as Locus I. Above Locus II households will donate both as church members and 
as non-members. However, above Locus II households will always be church members. 
This is because         holds when a household donates both as a church member 
and as a non-member. As church members, however, households receive higher utility than  
non-members since they enjoy the direct benefit     as church members. 
The third locus, denoted as Locus III, separates non-donating church members from non-
donating non-members. It is implicitly defined by       for   =    , which is 
equivalent to 
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Locus III is an increasing curve in the      -space. Generally, Locus III springs with 
infinite slope from the origin and is located above the     locus defined by      for 
all    .32 As Figure 2 shows, Locus III is only defined below Locus I. This is because 
above Locus I, non-members are donors so that Locus III cannot separate non-donating 
church members from non-donating non-members any longer. The fourth locus, denoted as 
Locus IV, separates non-donating church members from donating non-members. It is 
implicitly defined by        for       and     , that is, 
 
                                                       
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, Locus IV is also an increasing curve in the      -space. Locus IV 
is only defined above Locus I, because below Locus I households as non-members do not 
donate. Like Locus III also Locus IV is located above the     locus defined by 
    . Locus III and Locus IV intercept Locus I at the same point and have the same 
slope in that point. Generally, Locus IV may or may not have an intercept with Locus II. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the four loci in the (C,Y)-space 
 
                                                
                                                 
32
 The Appendix also considers the special case that Locus III coincides with the  - -locus defined by 
    . 
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Below Locus I households are non-donating non-members. Between the Loci I and IV 
households are donating non-members. Between the combination of the Loci III and IV 
and Locus II household are non-donating church members. Finally, above Locus II 
households are donating church members.  
Generally, the higher the disposable income   and the lower the church tax liability    the 
more likely it is that the household is both a church member and a donor. With a high 
disposable income it is likely that the total amount the household contributes exceeds the 
church tax liability. In this case the household can enjoy the direct benefit from church 
membership   (provided it is positive) without incurring additional costs. The household 
just offsets the burden of the church tax liability by reducing giving to other charitable 
causes. If the disposable income and the church tax liability are such that the household 
wants to contribute to a charitable cause in an amount lower than the church tax liability, 
the household will be a donating non-member. However as a donating non-member the 
household faces a double burden of not being a church member. First, the household 
forgoes the direct benefit of church membership. Second, the household does not fully 
“save” herself the church tax liability by being a non-member as she would offset the 
church tax liability by reducing other charitable giving when being a church member. 
Finally, if disposable income is low, the household will either be a non-donating church 
member or a non-donating non-member. The latter becomes the more likely, the higher the 
church tax liability. 
Figure 2 suggests that either being a non-donating church member or a donating non-
member are the most constrained types. With increasing income households not only 
prefer to become donors but also to become church members (provided that    ). With 
increasing church tax liabilities, on the other hand, households prefer to become non-
members. Thus, non-donating church members and donating non-members are to some 
extent the most transient among the four types. This reasoning leads us to our third 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Donors are more likely to be church members than non-members. 
 
Strictly speaking, the third hypothesis only applies to those households who do derive a 
positive direct benefit from church membership. However, to the extent that disposable 
income   and the direct benefit of church membership   are independently distributed 
across households, the hypothesis should apply more generally.  
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3.4 The Empirical Analysis 
 
3.4.1 Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data set on which we base the following the analysis is the 0.5%-sample of the 
German Taxpayer Panel which has been described in section 2.5. We conduct the same 
data screening procedures and define the same variables. In addition, we now compute the 
church tax liability for the tax units in our sample. 
C is the church tax liability. As the church tax liability is a function of taxable income 
which depends on the amount of charitable contributions we need to compute an 
exogenous measure of the church tax liability under the assumption of zero donations. This 
procedure is analogous to the computation of exogenous income and the exogenous “first-
dollar price” of giving. The church tax liability is then calculated for each tax unit as 
explicated in section 3.2 and in Appendix D. Due to the anonymization process, however, 
there is no information on the federal state of residence for the tax units in the two highest 
income classes with total incomes above 150,000 Euros. Instead, we only know whether 
these tax units live in one of the Western or in one of the Eastern federal states. We 
approximate their church tax liability by computing the sum that would have to be paid 
under the regulations which have been valid for the majority of members of a certain 
religious community in a certain year in either the Western or the Eastern federal states. 
Moreover, we do not know whether a tax unit has resigned form church during a certain 
year, so we assume that the church membership indicated in a tax return has been effective 
during the entire year.
33
 If a tax unit lives in a federal state where the upper limit to the 
church tax does not come into effect ex officio, we assume that the income-maximizing tax 
unit requests the exercise of this limit. As we are interested in the elasticity of charitable 
giving with regard to the church tax liability, we add 5 Euros to the church tax liability of 
every church member in order to be able to take the logarithm. 
The data screening procedures described above leave us with an unbalanced panel which 
contains 475,171 observations. The number of observations differs from that in the 
previous chapter because we had to exclude some tax units whose combination of income 
did not permit an unambiguous calculation of the church tax liability (compare p. 23). All 
monetary values are converted into constant 2006 Euro values using the consumer price 
index by the German Federal Statistical Office. 
                                                 
33
 In practice, if a taxpayer resigns from church in the course of a certain year, she needs to pay church tax 
only for the months of her membership. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Donations 733.46 27666.27 
Donations Dummy 0.457 0.498 
Income 87002.91 252071.40 
Price 0.761 0.206 
Church Tax 2090.70 12177.88 
Church Tax Dummy 0.676 0.468 
Eastern federal state 0.208 0.406 
Single female 0.150 0.357 
Single male 0.215 0.411 
Married, separately assessed 0.015 0.122 
Married couple 0.620 0.485 
Aged 15 to 24 0.026 0.160 
Aged 25 to 34 0.114 0.318 
Aged 35 to 44 0.256 0.436 
Aged 45 to 54 0.262 0.440 
Aged 55 to 64 0.203 0.402 
Aged 65 and above 0.139 0.346 
No children 0.547 0.498 
One child 0.185 0.389 
Two children 0.193 0.395 
Three children 0.059 0.235 
More than three children 0.017 0.128 
Year 2001 0.171 0.377 
Year 2002 0.167 0.373 
Year 2003 0.169 0.375 
Year 2004 0.169 0.374 
Year 2005 0.167 0.373 
Year 2006 0.156 0.363 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. All monetary values have been converted into constant 2006 
Euros values. The information on religious affiliation is available for only 474,922 tax units. 
 
The descriptive statistics are very similar to those in chapter 2. 67.6 % of the tax units are 
liable to church tax which means that either the taxpayer in a single household or at least 
one partner of a jointly assessed couple is a member of a religious community which raises 
church tax. The average church tax liability before any donations are made is around 2,090 
Euros. 
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If we take a closer look at the relationship between the church tax and charitable 
contributions, an interesting picture is revealed. Among the tax units which are church 
members
34
, the majority reports a positive amount of donations whereas most of the tax 
units without church membership are non-donors. 
 
 Church tax = 0 Church tax = 1  
Non-donors 114,364 143,808  
Donors 39,805 177,194  
 
As predicted by the model, donors seem to be more likely to be church members than non-
members. Among the tax units which report a positive amount of charitable contributions, 
39,805 are not church members, whereas the majority of 177,194 donating tax units owns a 
church membership. We test the hypothesis of whether the probability of being a church 
member equals 0.5 by means of a binomial test which is rejected (p < 0.01). 
Interestingly, the tax units which are church members dispose of a considerably higher 
average income than the tax units without any church membership. Thus, they seem to 
have greater financial resources available for donations
35
, but at the same time the average 
donations of the tax units without church membership are slightly higher than those of the 
church members. Obviously, the fewer donors without church membership make on 
average substantially higher contributions than the many donors who are church members. 
 
 Church tax = 0 Church tax = 1  
Average income 72,021 € 94,197 €  
Average 
donations 
757.58 € 721.88 €  
 
 
                                                 
34
 For the remainder of this chapter we will subsume singles that are church members and jointly assessed 
couples where at least one partner is member of a religious community which raises church tax under the 
term “church members”. 
35
 We do not have any information about the wealth of the tax units which may also be an important driver 
for charitable contributions. 
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3.4.2 The Results 
 
The effect of the church tax on charitable contributions 
In order to gain further insights into the relationship between the German church tax and 
charitable contributions, we first test the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model that 
church members‟ donations decrease with their church tax liability. As in the previous 
chapter, we apply both a Tobit model and a two-part model to the subsample of church 
members. 
Table 7 displays the regression results from all four models. Across all models, the church 
tax liability has a significantly positive effect on the amount of charitable contributions 
reported by the same tax unit. The magnitude of this effect, however, is rather small: The 
marginal effect (evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables) derived from the Tobit 
model is 0.02 which implies a 0.02% increase in donations when the church tax liability 
increases by 1%, so the reaction of charitable contributions to an increase in the church tax 
liability is very inelastic. If we separate the decision whether to donate at all from the 
decision how much to contribute, we see that the probability of being a donor increases by 
0.0012 if the church tax liability increases by 10%. For the subsample of donors, the 
elasticity of charitable contributions with regard to the church tax liability is estimated to 
be 0.017% in the random effects model and in the fixed effects model the church tax 
parameter estimate is insignificant. Summing up, the economic significance of the church 
tax variable obviously is very limited. 
 
As a robustness check, we estimated the same models only for those tax units where 
precise information regarding the federal state of residence is available. This means that we 
dropped all tax units with overall income above 150,000 Euros. The results may be found 
in Table B2 in the Appendix. Restricting the analysis to the individuals with precise 
information about the federal state of residence and therefore possibly more precise 
computations of the church tax liability, we do not find a significant effect of the church 
tax payments on charitable contributions at all. 
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Table 7: Regression results including the church tax liability 
 
Dependent variable: log(donations + 5) in (1), (3), (4) 
                        binary variable = 1 for donors in (2) 
 RE Tobit RE Probit  RE   FE 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(income) 0.357*** 0.124*** 0.374*** 0.155*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
log(price) -1.414*** -0.744*** -0.521*** -0.326*** 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.035) (0.032) 
log(churchtax) 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Eastern states -0.326*** -0.145*** -0.030 0.159 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.020) (0.119) 
single female  -0.318*** -0.120*** -0.064*** -0.362*** 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.062) 
single male -0.490*** -0.234*** -0.076*** -0.210*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.026) 
married sep. ass.  -0.292*** -0.154*** -0.042 -0.249*** 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.035) (0.040) 
age 15-24  -0.871*** -0.430*** -0.154*** 0.020 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.034) (0.051) 
age 25-34 -0.600*** -0.301*** -0.263*** -0.099*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.027) 
age 35-44 -0.275*** -0.147*** -0.143*** -0.040*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
age 55-64 0.294*** 0.156*** 0.157*** -0.035*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
age 65 + 0.580*** 0.263*** 0.345*** -0.043** 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.014) (0.020) 
one child 0.048*** 0.034*** -0.023** -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) 
two children 0.179*** 0.114*** 0.006 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.019) 
three children 0.331*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.090*** 
 (0.022) (0.009) (0.019) (0.029) 
> 3 children 0.488*** 0.205*** 0.274*** 0.105** 
 (0.041) (0.014) (0.032) (0.048) 
No. observations 
sigma (a) 
sigma (u) 
rho 
321,002 
2.645 
1.516 
0.753 
321,002 
1.859 
--- 
0.776 
177,194 
1.089 
0.722 
0.695 
177,194 
1.316 
0.722 
0.769 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust errors clustered on the individual level in (3) and (4)). Time 
dummies are included in all models. Column (1) reports marginal effects on the unconditional mean of the 
dependent variable, column (2) reports marginal effects on the probability of being a donor. Marginal effects 
are evaluated at the means of explanatory variables. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
 
When employing regression analysis, we cannot confirm the prediction of the theoretical 
model that charitable contributions decrease with the church tax liability of church 
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members. For the larger sample we find a positive relationship instead which is closely 
related to the finding from previous studies for the US that religious giving affects secular 
giving positively. It might be that the church tax payments are regarded as benefiting 
exclusively religious causes, so they would not be seen as a substitute for further secular 
charitable contributions. We cannot shed any further light on this issue because we do not 
know towards which charitable causes the contributions reported by church tax members 
are directed. On the other hand, it may be that the income and price variables effectively 
control for the church tax liability of a tax unit because the church tax is largely determined 
by these two variables and the remaining variation is rather small, which renders the 
precise estimation of the church tax effect difficult. 
 
Therefore, in a next step, we make use of the differing church tax rates within Germany. 
As explicated before, the rate is 8% of the fictitious income tax in the southern federal 
states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria and 9% in all other federal states. We would 
like to measure whether living in a state with the lower 8% church tax rate (the treatment 
group) has a measurable effect on the charitable contributions reported in the tax return. 
Our control group consists of the tax units living in a state with the 9% church tax rate. 
This approach encounters the difficulty that we observe only the actual outcome for each 
tax unit and we do not have any information on the counterfactual outcome, this means we 
do not know which amount of contributions the same tax unit would make if it was 
underlying a different church tax treatment.  
The “average treatment effect on the treated” (ATT) is the difference in contributions G(1), 
the observed outcome for tax units living in a state with 8% church tax rate, minus G(0), 
the contributions by the same treated tax units if they lived in a state with 9% church tax 
rate. 
 
     ⌊     |    ⌋    ⌊     |    ⌋ 
 
where      for tax units in the treatment group and      for tax units in the control 
group. The ATT is often measured by matching approaches (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983, Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005) which compare individuals 
with similar characteristics living in different circumstances, i.e. either in the treatment or 
in the control group. To obtain reliable results, the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) must be fulfilled which demands that conditional on a set of covariates   the 
treatment indicator   and the outcomes           are independent. In other words, if we 
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control for enough variables which determine the assignment of the treatment, this 
assignment is independent of the outcome. This is also called the “selection on 
observables” assumption. Moreover, we need to ensure that for any combination of the 
covariates   both the probabilities for being in the treatment group and for being in the 
control group are positive because otherwise we would not be able to estimate a treatment 
effect for certain tax units in the sample. Formally, this common support assumption is 
 
       |     
 
A matching of the tax units in the treatment and control group based on the covariates   
may be difficult because the number of tax units with exactly identical   values might be 
low. To avoid this problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that it is sufficient to 
estimate a propensity score – this is the estimated probability that a tax unit is part of the 
treatment group – to compare members of the treatment group to members of the control 
group. 
To conduct the propensity score matching, we dropped all observations with imprecise 
information about the federal state of residence and without any church membership and 
pooled all remaining observations. We estimated the propensity score through a Probit 
Model, where the dependent variable equals 1 for all tax units living in Baden-
Wuerttemberg or Bavaria and 0 for residents in all other federal states. We include income, 
the price of giving as well as several socio-demographic variables as explanatory variables. 
Table 8 shows that only few of the explanatory variables can actually explain the 
probability of being in the treatment group. This probability increases with income and the 
marginal tax rate and Catholics and Protestants have a higher propensity of being in the 
treatment group. Moreover, the Pseudo R
2
 is only 0.0382 which hints at very low 
explanatory power of the estimated model. The implications for the validity of our 
matching estimator will be discussed at a later point. 
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Table 8: Estimation of propensity scores 
 
Variables 
 
 
income 2.85e-07* 
 (1.46e-07) 
1 – marginal tax rate -0.249*** 
 (0.036) 
single female  0.004 
 (0.019) 
single male -0.038** 
 (0.019) 
married sep. ass.  0.030 
 (0.052) 
age 15-24  0.240*** 
 (0.032) 
age 25-34 0.021 
 (0.021) 
age 35-44 -0.014 
 (0.017) 
age 55-64 -0.013 
 (0.019) 
age 65 + -0.072*** 
 (0.022) 
Catholic 0.606*** 
 (0.026) 
Protestant 0.073*** 
 (0.026) 
other confession 0.137 
 (0.267) 
one child -0.059*** 
 (0.018) 
two children 0.007 
 (0.020) 
three children 0.072** 
 (0.032) 
> 3 children 0.020 
 (0.059) 
No. observations 223,920 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust errors clustered on the individual level). 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
 
The following results are derived from a radius matching with a radius of 0.05 which 
means that the difference in the estimated propensity for being in the treatment group must 
not differ by more than five percentage points between a tax unit from the treatment group 
and the matched observations from the control group. A tax unit from the treatment group 
is matched with all observations from the control group whose propensity score does not 
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differ by more than 0.05. This procedure avoids the drawback of a nearest-neighbor-
matching with potentially weak matches if the distance to the nearest neighbor is large. 
Our results hint at higher average contributions by the tax units living in a state with the 
8% church tax rate as compared to the matched tax units in the control group.
36
 
 
 Treatment Group Control Group Difference 
Average 
contributions 
224.92 € 175.60 € 49.32 € 
  
This difference in the reported charitable contributions may suggest that the church tax 
liability has a negative impact on the contributions by church members as predicted by the 
theoretical model. However, there are some serious limitations to this procedure which 
may render the difference of 49.32 Euros an invalid estimate. 
First of all, the CIA assumption is likely to be violated. We needed to assume that the 
assignment to the treatment group – this means living in the federal states Baden-
Wuerttemberg or Bavaria – is only determined by the observable characteristics we 
included in the Probit model. However, it might be possible that there are further 
individual characteristics and preferences which influence both the decision where to live 
and how much to donate. For example, the economically strong federal states of Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Bavaria might attract many high-skilled workers who usually exhibit 
higher mobility.
37
 At the same time education has been shown to have a positive impact on 
donations (see for example Schervish and Havens, 1997). In this case, the difference in 
contributions would not necessarily result from the difference in church tax rates. Indeed, 
the low Pseudo R
2 
of the Probit model we used to estimate the propensity scores suggests 
that the explanatory power of the variables included is very low. Summing up, there might 
be individual characteristics which affect the decision in which federal state to live but 
cannot be controlled for by using tax return data because tax return data usually do not 
dispose of comprehensive socio-demographic information.  
Moreover, the estimation of propensity scores may suffer from endogeneity. It might be 
reasonable to assume that income, number of children and religious affiliation do not 
determine the federal state of residence but vice versa. If mobility within Germany is not 
so high and individuals remain in the federal state where they have grown up, the cultural 
                                                 
36
 Bootstrapping of the standard errors was not possible due to technical limitations. The t-statistic for the 
difference given by the Stata psmatch2 command is 4.96. 
37
 According to Frick (1996), a higher education goes along with higher flexibility. 
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background and the economic opportunities in the state will determine income, number of 
children and religious affiliation, and the estimated propensity scores would be biased.  
 
The interrelation of charitable contributions and church membership 
A second hypothesis which can be derived from the theoretical model is that church 
members who do not make charitable contributions are more likely to resign from their 
religious community when the church tax liability increases than church members who 
donate. 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a Probit model for the probability of resigning from 
church by pooling all observations. First, we generate a dummy variable indicating 
whether a tax unit has resigned from church. The binary variable resign equals 1 if a tax 
unit has exhibited some kind of church membership in period t-1 and is not liable to church 
tax anymore in period t. The variable non-donor equals 1 in period t if the tax unit has not 
reported any charitable contributions in the period t-1, and equals 0 otherwise. As we 
assume that t-1 is the period in which the decision whether to resign or not is made by the 
tax unit, we include the lagged values from period t-1 of several socio-demographic 
variables. To account for changes in the consumption possibilities of the tax unit at the 
point where the decision whether to resign is made, we include the change in income and 
price of giving from period   t-2 to period t-1 in the analysis. 
We restrict the sample to those tax units with complete information regarding the variables 
defined above and experiencing an increase in the church tax liability between period t-2 
and period t-1, the period in which the decision whether to resign from church in period t is 
made. 
The results in Table 9 show that indeed the probability of resigning from church is higher 
for those tax units that have not donated in the previous period. Being a non-donor 
increases the probability of resigning from church by 0.01 which confirms the prediction 
from the theoretical model, although the effect is small. Interestingly, an increase in 
income before the decision is taken increases the probability of resigning from church, too. 
Moreover, tax units living in the Eastern federal states have a higher propensity to leave 
their religious community as do singles and separately assessed individuals, whereas the 
presence of children decreases this propensity. Compared to the baseline group of tax units 
with a household head aged between 45 and 54 years, tax units with a younger household 
head are more likely to resign from church whereas tax units with an older household head 
are less likely to do so. 
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Table 9: Estimation of probability to resign from church 
Dependent variable: binary variable =1 for tax units which resigned from church 
 
Variables Probit 
non-donor in t-1 0.010*** 
 (0.001) 
income in t-1 minus income in t-2 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
price in t-1 minus price in t-2 -0.002 
 (0.004) 
Eastern federal state in t-1 0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
presence of children in t-1 -0.002** 
 (0.001) 
single female in t-1 0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
single male in t-1 0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
married sep. ass. in t-1 0.012** 
 (0.006) 
age 15 – 24 in t-1 0.008** 
 (0.003) 
age 25 – 34 in t-1 0.004** 
 (0.002) 
age 35 – 44 in t-1 0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
age 55 – 64 in t-1 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
age 65 + in t-1 -0.013*** 
 (0.001) 
No. observations 
Pseudo R2 
82,271 
0.0302 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust errors clustered on the individual level). Marginal effects are 
evaluated at the means of explanatory variables. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter delivers some first insights on the interplay between the German church tax 
and charitable giving. We establish a simple household model where we treat the church 
tax as a voluntary contribution and derive three hypotheses which we empirically test with 
the tax return data. 
With regard to the choice of church membership, the empirical analysis confirms both 
hypotheses: Donors are more likely to be church members than non-members and the 
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probability to resign from church after an increase in the church tax liability is higher for 
tax units which have not reported any charitable contributions in the previous period. 
While donating church members are able to compensate a higher church tax liability by 
increasing their donations, this is not true for non-donating members. Instead, they are 
worse off when the church tax liability increases and decide to leave church.  
The empirical evidence on the third hypothesis, that the amount of individual charitable 
contributions decreases when the individual church tax liability increases, is mixed. The 
regression results indicate a small but significant positive relationship between the church 
tax and charitable giving for all church members. If we restrict the sample to the church 
members for which we have precise information regarding the federal state of residence, 
which makes the computation of the exogenous church tax liability more reliable, we 
cannot establish a significant effect of the church tax on charitable giving. This result is 
similar to the findings by US studies that religious giving does not negatively interfere with 
giving to other causes. 
The results from the propensity score matching approach, which exploits the fact that the 
church tax rate varies across the federal state, suggest that tax units which face the lower 
church tax rate are more generous givers than tax units facing the higher church tax rate. 
The assumptions underlying the matching approach, however, are very likely to be violated 
in our setting. 
Due to the mixed results, we refrain from drawing definite conclusions with regard to the 
relationship of the church tax and charitable giving in Germany. With hopefully more 
detailed data available in the future, more precise analyses would be possible. For example, 
comprehensive information on the federal state of residence for all income classes could be 
useful for a better approximation of the church tax liability. With even more detailed 
information on the municipality where a church member lives, it would also be possible to 
incorporate the local church fee into the analysis. The local church fee is raised by several 
local religious communities and can be of both obligatory and voluntary nature. Its 
consideration could add additional variation to the data and thereby deliver additional 
insights on the interplay of religious contributions and other charitable giving. 
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4 Experimental Evidence on Donors’ Preferences for Charities 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Topic 
 
When individuals make a real-life donation decision, they usually do not have precise 
information about a charity‟s income streams. They do not know whether and how much 
their neighbors or other people in their social community donate to a certain charity. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether they are aware of the exact amount of government 
subsidies given to that charity. They may rather have a belief about the charity‟s size in 
terms of entire revenues, i.e. whether it is small or large. In this paper, we explore whether 
the size of a charity increases or decreases the willingness to donate to that charity which 
may have implications for the fundraising policies of such organizations. To this end, we 
conducted a donation experiment where we provided potential donors with information 
about the charities' revenues. 
With regard to the impact of information about a charity‟s revenues on charitable 
contributions, various approaches may be relevant. So far, most theoretical models and 
empirical studies have analyzed either the effects of government contributions or those of 
other individuals‟ contributions on private donations. The public goods model predicts 
complete or incomplete crowding out of voluntary contributions by government financial 
support. On the other hand, the approaches of quality signaling and conditional cooperation 
predict that donations increase with others‟ contributions. The experimental evidence hints 
at incomplete crowding out of private donations by government subsidies, while several 
studies on social information find a positive relation between others‟ contributions and 
those of one‟s own. Unlike other approaches, the model of impact philanthropy explicitly 
models the effect of an increase in a charity‟s entire revenues – i.e. its endowment – on 
donations. As the charity‟s endowment goes up, the impact philanthropist‟s utility 
decreases because the relative impact of her donations is reduced.  
In this chapter, we present a framed field experiment where a non-student subject pool was 
asked to make a real donation decision. Half of the subjects could choose whether to give 
to a charity with relatively low annual revenues or to a charity with relatively high annual 
revenues. We thereby present evidence on the overall effect of a charity‟s endowment on 
private donations and show a negative relation between the two. 
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4.2 Background and Motivation 
 
Third-party contributions to a charity may stem from government subsidies or other 
individuals‟ donations, respectively. So far, several theoretical models and empirical 
studies have separately looked at the effects of either government contributions or others‟ 
contributions on private donations. 
The standard public goods model (Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom et al., 1986), 
where an individual derives utility from private consumption as well as the total supply of 
the public good, predicts that private contributions to the public good are completely 
crowded out by government contributions to the same good. It is reasonable, though, to 
assume that a potential donor also derives positive utility from the mere act of contributing. 
Andreoni (1989, 1990) coins the term „warm glow‟ to describe such preferences, where an 
individual‟s utility increases with the contributed amount. In this case, government 
contributions are not a perfect substitute for voluntary contributions, which implies that the 
former crowd out the latter only incompletely.  
The empirical evidence on the theoretical predictions of crowding out is mixed. While 
many studies find evidence for incomplete crowding out (among others Ribar and 
Wilhelm, 2002; Gruber and Hungerman, 2007; Andreoni and Payne, 2011)
38
, there is also 
empirical evidence for crowding in of voluntary contributions (see, for example, Khanna et 
al., 1995; Khanna and Sandler, 2000). Brooks (2000) uses data for the special case of 
symphony orchestras and finds evidence for crowding in at low levels of government 
funding and crowding out at high levels of government funding indicating a non-linear 
relationship of private giving and government funding. Furthermore, the majority of lab 
experiments, which test the hypothesis of complete crowding out, find evidence for partial 
crowding out of voluntary contributions (Andreoni, 1993; Bolton and Katok, 1998; Chan et 
al., 2002; Konow, 2010). 
As charities do not only earn income from government contributions, but also from 
individuals‟ private donations, further theoretical approaches have to be taken into account. 
One approach is to model contributions by other individuals as a signal of the charity‟s 
quality as Vesterlund (2003) suggests. Typically, donations are not made simultaneously, 
but rather in a sequential manner, where high donations by other individuals signal a high-
quality charity which may induce donors to give larger amounts to that organization. 
Andreoni (2006a) remarks that leadership gifts may also be perceived as a signal for the 
respective charity‟s quality. Furthermore, the phenomenon of conditional cooperation 
                                                 
38
 See Steinberg (1991) for a literature review. 
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predicts that individuals will be more willing to contribute if they know that others 
contribute (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Several natural field experiments deliver evidence 
that information about other individuals‟ contributions affects donations positively, e.g. 
Frey and Meier (2004), Croson and Shang (2008, 2009), and Martin and Randal (2008). 
In his theory of impact philanthropy, Duncan (2004) explicitly models how a change in a 
charity‟s endowment affects individual donations. An impact philanthropist wants her 
donation to have a distinct effect on the supply of a charitable good and thus to “personally 
make a difference”. According to Duncan (2004), the revenues needed for the production 
of a charitable good consist of the charity‟s endowment   and the individual‟s 
contributions  . The production function      with       satisfies      and 
      . The utility function of the impact philanthropist is               where 
  is the individual‟s wealth,       and      and               is the impact 
of the philanthropist‟s donation. Because 
 
  
  
       [             ]                   
 
an increase in the charity‟s endowment decreases the impact philanthropist‟s utility; the 
importance and the impact of the philanthropist‟s donation are reduced. It then may be that 
an impact philanthropist – if provided with the choice between two charities of different 
size – chooses to give to the charity with smaller income streams because this strengthens 
the relative impact of her gift. The model of impact philanthropy, however, does not lead 
to clear predictions how a change in the endowment of a charity would affect the size of 
the gift.
39
 It can be shown that 
   
  
    where     is the contribution which maximizes the 
impact philanthropist‟s utility, so the direction of the effect is not clear a priori. Moreover, 
Duncan (2004) emphasizes that an impact philanthropist dislikes the administrative costs 
of a charity to be financed by her contribution because this also reduces the charitable 
impact of the donation. 
Our approach differs from previous experiments in two important aspects. First, the 
information presented to each subject in our experiment consists of an interval stating the 
yearly revenues received by an organization which comprises donations, membership fees 
and public subsidies, i.e. its endowment. We deem this kind of information to be very close 
to the situation potential donors find themselves in the real world, as they usually cannot 
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 To keep our remarks as concise as possible, the interested reader is referred to Duncan (2004) for a more 
detailed description of the derivation of this result. 
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distinguish the size of other donors‟ gifts and government subsidies. The information is 
provided to distinguish charities solely by their size. We empirically test the prediction of 
the model of impact philanthropy by offering subjects two charities of different size for the 
same charitable cause. If an increase in the endowment does affect utility negatively, 
subjects should choose the smaller charity. Moreover, we test how a change in the charity‟s 
endowment affects the size of the gift and we compare the donation decision of subjects 
who receive information about the charity‟s endowment with those who do not receive this 
information. 
Second, we use a framed field experiment rather than a natural field experiment. Unlike in 
a natural field experiment, subjects in a framed field experiment undertake the task in an 
artificial environment and know that they are part of an experiment (Harrison and List, 
2004). Although this may bias the subjects‟ behavior to some extent, we can make use of 
the advantages of framed field experiments in terms of more control and the elicitation of 
personal characteristics of our participants. In addition, we can exploit the fact that the 
donation decisions are made completely anonymously in our setting. In door-to-door-
fundraising, solicitation letter campaigns or other kinds of donation campaigns the identity 
of the donor is usually known to the organization. By means of our double-blind 
procedure, neither other experimental subjects nor the experimenter know the decision 
made by a certain participant. This enables us to rule out an experimenter effect or certain 
motivations such as signaling of wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) or social approval 
(Holländer, 1990). That such social incentive effects can arise from removing anonymity 
or increasing visibility is shown in the field (Soetevent, 2005, 2011) as well as in the lab 
(Hoffman et al. 1994; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004).  
Moreover, framed field experiments are characterized by a non-student subject pool and 
field context in the commodity and therefore offer more realism than conventional lab 
experiments (Harrison and List, 2004). A weakness of lab experiments is often seen in the 
low representativeness of the sample and thus the lacking generalizability of results. 
Especially in the case of donation decisions representativeness may be important. 
Carpenter et al. (2008) for example show that students in a lab experiment tend to be less 
likely to donate to a charity than members from the broader community. In addition, a 
more representative sample offers the possibility to analyze the impact of the socio-
demographic characteristics on charitable contributions. 
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4.3 Experimental Design 
 
4.3.1 Implementation and Participants 
 
For subject recruitment, invitation letters were randomly distributed in the city of 
Mannheim, Germany (see Appendix G). The letter contained an invitation to take part in a 
scientific study and informed people that they would receive €40 for participation. It was 
announced that there would be a kind of survey in which they could (voluntarily and 
anonymously) make consumption decisions. We used a relatively high show-up fee in 
order to avoid underrepresentation of people with high opportunity costs of time. 
Furthermore, we already emphasized in the invitation letter that the money was a reward 
for participation in the study in order to make people feel entitled to their endowment and 
to avoid a bias due to unexpected gift money. The experiment took place in July 2009 on 
the premises of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. A total 
of 223 participants took part in the experiment. At the beginning of each session, the 
participants individually drew lots to determine their ID number (which remained 
unknown to other participants and the experimenters) and chose a table. The tables had 
privacy screens on every side to ensure private decisions and answers. The participants 
were not allowed to talk to each other. If they had questions, the experimenters answered 
them privately. The 12 experimental sessions lasted around 60 minutes each. Within one 
session, all the subjects performed exactly the same task. At first, all the participants 
obtained detailed instructions about the course of the experiment (see Appendix F). The 
main features were orally repeated. We emphasized that all the information given in the 
instructions was true. The participants in all the treatments filled out a questionnaire with 
questions about socio-demographic characteristics, their donation habits, and their attitude 
toward their own social standing within society and toward government responsibilities. 
The attitudinal questions were taken from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) 
which is conducted every two years with a representative sample of the German 
population.
40
 At the end of each session, the participants had the chance to comment on the 
experiment and to give reasons for their decisions (see Figure E1 in Appendix E for an 
overview of the experimental proceedings). 
The participants‟ socio-demographic characteristics are shown in Appendix E (Table E1 
and Table E2). The subject pool is highly diversified with for example age ranging from 18 
to 75 years. Although it is not fully representative of the German resident population, it is 
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 For detailed information, see http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/allbus/. 
62 
 
sufficiently diversified in all socio-demographic variables in order to examine the 
influence of each variable on charitable behavior. Moreover, in case of gender, income, 
and religion, the distribution of our subject pool does not significantly differ from that of 
the German population (binomial test, chi squared test, t-test, p>0.1)
41
. More precisely, 
46.2% of subjects are male. 22.9% dispose of a monthly net household income of less than 
€1,000, most of the subjects live in households with incomes between €1,000 and €3,000 
and only 13.0% have more than €3,000 per month disposable. With regard to religion, 
Catholics (31.4%) and Protestants (31.8%) are equally represented, whereas 6.7% possess 
another religious affiliation and 30.0% of all the subjects do not belong to any religious 
community. The participants‟ responses to questions regarding their giving behavior in the 
past as well as their attitudes are also displayed in Appendix E (Table E3 and Table E4).  
 
4.3.2 Treatments 
 
The experiment comprised two treatments which both contained a real donation stage 
where the subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much (if any) of their 
endowment to donate to a certain charity. The subjects were informed that all of the 
selected charities have obtained the „DZI Spendensiegel‟, a label for charities that use their 
funds economically and according to their statutes.
42
 The subjects could choose one of four 
charitable causes, namely disabled care, development aid, medical research, and animal 
protection. To avoid any reputation effects, the subjects knew only the purpose but not the 
name of the organizations. All the donation decisions were completely voluntary and 
anonymous. We used a double-blind procedure in which neither the other subjects nor the 
experimenters came to know if, how much and to which cause a subject donated. The 
subjects received a large envelope containing two small envelopes and the endowment of 
€40 broken into two 10-euro notes, one 5-euro note, six 2-euro coins, and three 1-euro 
coins. This breakdown enabled subjects to donate any integer amount between €0 and €40 
and abated incentives to only give the coins. The subjects placed the amount they wished 
to donate in one of the small envelopes assigned to donations, labeled the envelope with 
their ID number and, in case they were willing to give a positive amount, the charitable 
cause to which they wished to donate. The amount of money the subjects wished to keep 
for themselves was placed in the other small envelope. Afterwards, the subjects dropped 
the sealed envelope specified for donations in a box.  
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 Unless stated otherwise, all tests in this paper are two-sided. 
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 For more information (in German language), see www.dzi.de. 
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The baseline treatment (“NoInfo”) with 113 participants involved the above described 
donation stage and the completion of the questionnaire. The 110 participants in the 
treatment “Info” were informed not only about the charitable cause of the organizations 
but also about the total revenues in 2006, which comprise donations, membership fees and 
public subsidies. For each charitable cause, we offered two organizations, one relatively 
small organization with revenues between €40,000 and €300,000 and one relatively large 
organization with revenues between €5 million and €11 million. Thus, the subjects in this 
treatment could choose one of eight organizations for their donation. All the donations 
made during the experiment were transferred in full to the respective organizations. In case 
of the NoInfo treatment, donations were equally assigned to small and large organizations 
of the same cause. The counting of donations and the transfer to the organizations were 
notarially monitored and certified. This procedure and the name of the notary were already 
announced in the experimental instructions.
43
 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 The Effects of Charities’ Size 
 
In total, €1,225 are donated to the charities. The mean donation per participant is €5.49 or 
13.7% of the endowment, the median donation is €3.00. Broken down by purposes, €448 
are donated to disabled care, €318 to development aid, €274 to medical research, and €185 
to animal protection. Disabled care is not only the purpose which is selected most 
frequently (21%) but which also receives the highest average donations (€9.53). Whereas 
average donations do not significantly differ between the four purposes, animal protection 
is the only charitable cause which is chosen with a probability significantly below 0.25 
(binomial test 5% significance). Overall, 33% of the subjects do not make a donation at all. 
Table 10 contains the descriptive statistics of the donation decisions. 
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 Some participants also completed another task (a dictator game) in the experiment which is not part of this 
paper. As this task did not affect the donation decision, we pooled the data. 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Observations Share in % Total donation  
(in €) 
Average 
donation (in €) 
No donation 74           33           0 0    
Donation 149           67           1,225           8.22    
 Disabled care 47          21 448          9.53    
 Development 
aid 
39           17          318           8.15    
 Medical 
research 
38 17                    274           7.21    
 Animal 
protection 
25           11          185          7.40    
Total         223          100          1,225          5.49    
 
In the NoInfo treatment in which the subjects do not obtain information about charity 
revenues, the mean donation per participant is €5.56. In the Info treatment in which 
subjects obtain this information, the mean donation is €5.43 (compare Table 11). 
Interestingly, providing participants with the information about a charity‟s revenues and 
giving them the opportunity to choose between charities of different size neither has an 
impact on individual donations nor on the probability to select a certain charitable cause. 
However, it shifts donations within the group of subjects who are given the choice and the 
information; €455 are donated to the small organizations and only €132 are donated to the 
large organizations. On average, the participants donate €8.92 to the small organizations 
and €6.95 to the large organizations; this difference, however, is not statistically 
significant.  
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics – NoInfo versus Info Treatment 
 
 Observations Share in % by 
treatment 
Total donation  
(in €) 
Average 
donation (in €) 
NoInfo treatment 113           100          628 5.56   
 No donation 35         31 0           0 
 Donation 78         69 628         8.05    
Info treatment 110          100 597 5.43 
 No donation 39 36 0 0 
 Small 
organization 
51 46 455 8.92 
 Large 
organization 
19 17 132 6.95    
Total         223          100          1,225          5.49    
 
Out of the 110 subjects who receive the information and make a positive donation, 73% 
choose the small organization, and only 27% choose the large organization. Thus, the shift 
of donations occurs mainly because the small organizations are selected more frequently 
than the large organizations (chi squared test 1% significance). We observe this effect for 
all the charitable causes, but if we look at each cause separately it is only significant for 
disabled care (chi squared test 1% significance, compare Figure 3). Indeed, the preference 
for the small organizations appears to be very pronounced in the case of disabled care; 
here, 86% of donors choose the small organization while only 14% choose the large one. 
In case of development aid (medical research, animal protection), 68% (64%, 69%) of 
donors select the small organization. Obviously, the strength of the preference for small 
charities differs between the four charitable causes. For example, for charities which are 
active in the field of medical research this preference is not as strong as in the case of 
disabled care. It may be that donors deem a large charity to be more effective than many 
small charities in fighting diseases whereas they prefer smaller and possibly more locally 
oriented charities in the case of disabled care. 
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Figure 3: Selection of organization size in the Info treatment [in % of donors] 
Overall, this result supports the prediction derived from impact philanthropy theory that an 
increase in a charity‟s endowment decreases the donor‟s willingness to give to that charity. 
So, if provided with the choice of charities of different size which serve the same 
charitable cause, individuals tend to prefer the small ones.  However, there may be some 
other possible reasons for this preference which are not captured by the impact 
philanthropy model. For example, Fong and Luttmer (2009) show that people who feel 
close to their racial or ethnic group donate substantially more when the recipients are of the 
same race than when they are from a different race. Similar reasoning may hypothesize 
that people who feel close to their region are more likely to donate to small charities if they 
associate them with more local activities. 
For this reason, we conducted an ex-post online survey with the subjects who participated 
in the Info treatment. The survey was completely anonymous and contained questions 
about the decisions in the experiment, namely (i) whether subjects donated a positive 
amount, if so (ii) to which charitable cause, (iii) to a small or a large organization, and 
given that choice (iv) for what reason they chose the small or the large organization. All 
questions offered predetermined answers including the option “I cannot remember”. If 
participants had chosen the small organization, they were provided with the following 
answers: “For my decision to donate to the small organization, it was decisive that (a) my 
donation to the small organization has a higher impact compared to a large organization, 
(b) small organizations are discriminated against compared to large ones and therefore 
need more support, (c) small organizations have lower administrative costs compared to 
large ones and therefore my donation is more likely to benefit the actual charitable cause, 
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(d) small organizations are more likely to act on a local level compared to large ones, (e) 
small organizations are more specialized in certain fields of activity compared to large 
ones, (f) other reasons.” If participants had chosen the large organization, they were 
provided with the following options: “For my decision to donate to the large organization, 
it was decisive that (a) the large organization was able to already collect many funds 
(consisting of donations, membership fees and public subsidies), (b) large organizations 
can achieve more with my donation than the small ones, (c) large organizations have a 
higher level of familiarity compared to small ones, (d) large organizations are more likely 
to act professionally compared to small ones, (e) other reasons.” In both cases, the order of 
the predetermined options varied randomly between participants, they could select several 
options and give further reasons in an open description field.  
 
Figure 4: Reasons to choose the small organization [in % of donors] 
 
Out of the 104 individuals who were invited to the survey 81 individuals took part.
44
 The 
statements made in the survey are consistent with the observed behavior in the experiment, 
i.e. there are no significant differences between the survey data and the experimental data. 
For example, the 68% of respondents stating in the survey that they donated a positive 
amount correspond to 64% who in fact donated a positive amount in the experiment. The 
reasons which are mentioned most frequently for the decision to choose a small 
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details. 
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organization are lower administrative costs (50%) and a possible higher impact of the own 
donation (44%). Recall that both of these motives are captured by the impact philanthropy 
theory. A further reason which is mentioned frequently is the neediness of small 
organizations (39%), indicating that crowding out considerations may also play a role (see 
Figure 4).  
Regarding the choice of the large organization, the most frequently stated reason is the 
professionalism of large organizations (86%) followed by the achievement of objectives 
(43%) and the apparent ability to acquire funds (29%). All these motivations support the 
quality signaling approach. However, this signal attracts only few donors in our 
experiment. 
 
4.4.2 The Effects of Individual Characteristics 
 
In the following, we report the results from a series of econometric estimations to explore 
the impact of various socio-demographic variables which have been surveyed in the 
questionnaire.
45
 Around 33% of the subjects decided not to donate, hence there is a large 
number of observations clustered at zero donations. Since ordinary least squares estimates 
would not be accurate, we apply a Tobit model. In the baseline estimation, we include the 
following socio-demographic variables: age, household size as the absolute number of 
household members including children, dummy variables for male subjects, unmarried 
subjects, subjects not having any religious affiliation (no religion), voters of the left party, 
highly educated subjects (education, owning a graduate degree), high income subjects 
(monthly net household income of 2,000 € or more).  
We additionally include four attitudinal variables taken from the ALLBUS to control for 
one‟s perceived standing within society and the attitude towards the state. More precisely, 
the variable position is a dummy variable for subjects thinking they receive their fair share 
or more compared to others living in Germany. The variable disparities is coded as „1‟ for 
those subjects believing that the social disparities in Germany are just. The variable state 
resp is a dummy for subjects who want the state to care for a good living in case of illness, 
misery, unemployment, and old age. Similarly, the variable equalize takes the value „1‟ if a 
subject indicates that it is the responsibility of the state to reduce income disparities. 
Although it is quite common to include attitudinal variables in econometric estimations 
(see, for example, Corneo and Grüner, 2002), the causality between these variables and the 
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 The number of observations in the econometric analysis corresponds to the number of subjects with 
complete socio-demographic information. 
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dependent variable (donations) may run in both directions, i.e. these variables may be 
endogenous. For this reason, Table 12 displays both estimations with attitudinal variables 
and those without these variables in order to show whether effects are robust to this 
modification. The second specification furthermore includes a dummy variable for the 
subjects who already made a charitable donation in the year 2009 (donor 2009) in order to 
control for offsetting effects. Furthermore, we run both estimations with and without 
outliers. Outliers are defined as those subjects donating more than half their endowment 
(€20, five subjects). 
Our results show a positive and highly significant effect of age on charitable contributions, 
whereas the coefficients for male donors and household size are not significant. These 
findings are robust across all four specifications. Moreover, across all four estimations, the 
voters of the left party – which tend to assign the responsibility for tackling social issues to 
the government – give significantly smaller amounts than all the other subjects whereas 
being unmarried affects the donation decision positively.  
The subjects without a religious affiliation seem to make significantly lower contributions, 
but the corresponding coefficient is only significant when outliers are excluded. As 
expected from previous empirical investigations, high income and high education both 
have a positive impact on donations although the significance levels vary according to the 
estimation specification. The relation between donations in the experiment and donations 
that have been made in the year 2009 previously to the experiment is negative, though not 
significant. Furthermore, the attitudinal variables do not have any explanatory power.
46
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 We also investigated whether the subjects‟ characteristics differ between donors choosing the small 
organization and donors choosing the large organization. Using a nested logit model, we do not find any 
significant differences between the two groups. 
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Table 12: Tobit estimation results 
 
Dependent variable: amount donated  
 Including outliers Excluding outliers 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
_cons -11.27*** -9.088* -5.904* -5.685 
 (-2.671) (-1.931) (-1.782) (-1.532) 
age 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.170*** 0.183*** 
 (3.760) (3.780) (3.461) (3.648) 
male -1.563 -1.658 -0.773 -1.083 
 (-1.094) (-1.147) (-0.689) (-0.950) 
household size  -0.00620 -0.125 -0.298 -0.461 
 (-0.00738) (-0.147) (-0.451) (-0.686) 
unmarried 6.419*** 5.893*** 4.193*** 4.099** 
 (3.201) (2.939) (2.646) (2.572) 
no religion  -1.279 -1.200 -3.179** -3.120** 
 (-0.812) (-0.762) (-2.522) (-2.457) 
left party  -9.109*** -9.315*** -6.822*** -6.611*** 
 (-2.996) (-2.996) (-2.899) (-2.747) 
education   3.991*** 3.962** 2.187* 2.271* 
 (2.622) (2.593) (1.834) (1.890) 
income 4.695*** 4.614*** 3.357** 3.353** 
 (2.722) (2.675) (2.480) (2.470) 
donor 2009   -2.194  -1.369 
  (-1.333)  (-1.058) 
position  0.0959  -0.301 
  (0.0621)  (-0.248) 
disparities  0.988  1.730 
  (0.605)  (1.349) 
state resp  -2.541  -0.212 
  (-1.411)  (-0.145) 
equalize  1.100  -0.467 
  (0.748)  (-0.398) 
No. observations 
LR Chi²  
Pseudo R²  
189 
44.53*** 
0.0418 
189 
49.09*** 
0.0460 
184 
39.95*** 
0.0414 
184 
43.39*** 
0.0450 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Estimations (3) and (4) exclude outliers. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
The results of our experiment contribute to the understanding of how the provision of 
information about charities‟ entire revenues affects individual donation decisions. We 
deem this kind of information to be realistic, because in real-life donation decisions, 
individuals usually do not precisely know whether and how much other individuals or 
government institutions have given to a charity but rather have a belief about its size. 
While the announcement of other individuals‟ contributions, as implemented in previous 
experiments, is likely to lead to the emergence of anchor points or the desire to comply 
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with own or others‟ expectations, the information provided in our experiment does not 
point in one specific direction but rather offers two charities of different size. 
Providing individuals with the information about the charities‟ revenues and the 
opportunity to choose between small and large charities increases neither the propensity to 
donate nor the donated amount compared to the situation without this information. We do 
find, however, that the subjects prefer to give to small charities with relatively low 
revenues as compared to large charities. Thus, our results support the predictions that may 
be derived from the model of impact philanthropy by Duncan (2004), which assumes that 
donors try to achieve the biggest impact possible with their charitable contribution. More 
precisely, in our experiment donors prefer smaller charities to larger ones, confirming the 
theoretical prediction that an impact philanthropist‟s utility decreases with a charity‟s 
endowment. As our survey results show, however, crowding out considerations as well as 
quality considerations as suggested by Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006a) also play a 
role for some donors. 
Moreover, the results of our econometric analysis confirm previous findings that the 
individual willingness to donate increases with the subjects‟ age, income, and education 
(e.g. Pharoah and Tanner, 1997; Schervish and Havens, 1997). This suggests that the 
donation decisions in our experiment are a good indicator of real-life decisions. As 
individuals with certain characteristics are more likely to react positively when provided 
with the opportunity to make a donation, fundraisers may be able to increase donations by 
specifically targeting those individuals. 
The key result of our study, the donors‟ preference for smaller charities, has to be seen in 
the light of the experimental design. The experiment offered the participants a choice of 
pre-selected charities which all fulfill a certain minimum quality standard. Thus, the 
preference for small charities is conditional on third-party validation and may be different 
in the absence of such validation. Indeed, the lack of convergence of small and large 
charities, that would eventually be a consequence of our findings, may be explained by this 
design element. Our findings are nevertheless important as they indicate a general 
preference for smaller charities when the donors can assume a minimum quality. Charities 
may exploit this preference by designing their fundraising efforts accordingly. 
Interestingly, the strength of the preference for small charities differs between the four 
charitable causes. For charities which are active in the field of medical research this 
preference is not as strong as in the case of disabled care. Donors may deem a large charity 
to be more effective than many small charities in fighting diseases whereas they prefer 
smaller and possibly more locally oriented charities in the case of disabled care. Thus, the 
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natural size of a charity depends on the charitable cause it engages in, which means that 
there would hardly be any convergence between small and large charities. 
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Appendix A: Computation of Marginal Income Tax Rates 
In the following, we show in detail how the marginal income tax rates have been 
computed. First of all, the income tax tariffs for the assessment periods 2001 to 2006 are 
displayed: 
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Income tax tariff 2004 (in Euro) 
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Income tax tariff 2005 and 2006 (in Euro) 
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In what follows, we take the same approach as Auer and Kalusche (2007) and depart from 
the income tax tariff as a quadratic function of income 
 
                   
 
where   is the income tax liability and    is taxable income as above. 
The marginal tax rate is 
  
  
   
         
 
In case of joint assessment 
    [(  
  
 
   
  
 
  )] 
 
and the marginal tax rate is 
         
 
The values for   and   may be derived from the income tax tariff of the respective 
assessment period. To save some space we will show the details of this derivation only for 
the assessment period 2001. 
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Assessment period 2001 
 
Taxable income (TI)  
                  
                    
      
       
           
                     
      
       
            
                       
 
 
For incomes between 14,094 DM and 18,089 DM: 
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For incomes between 18,090 DM and 107,567 DM: 
 
[       (
         
      
)       ]  (
         
      
)     
 [
         
      
 
             
      
      ]  (
         
      
)     
 
          
       
 
                
       
 
                
       
 
              
       
 
        
      
 
            
      
    
 
      
       
                          
 
85 
 
Assessment periods 2002 and 2003 
 
Taxable income (TI)  
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Assessment periods 2005 and 2006 
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The computation of marginal tax rates turns out to be more complicated if a tax unit reports 
tax exempt income (PV) or extraordinary income (AO). We will distinguish three cases 
aside from tax units which report neither PV nor AO: 
 
1.              47 
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with       the marginal income tax rate derived for a certain income and      the 
average income tax rate to be paid. The values for   and   necessary to compute 
          are the same as described above, evaluated at      . 
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In case that         and       , the marginal tax rate is 
 
       ⁄     
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 The derivation of this result can also be found in Hechtner (2010). 
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3.               
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Independently of the income composition, it is important to take into account that a 
marginal change in the effective income tax liability (             is caused by both the 
marginal change in the income tax liability   and the marginal change in the solidarity 
surcharge      : 
  
                   
 
      
 (    (    ))
      
 
     
     
 
     
      
 
 
     
     
 can be derived from the illustration in section 2.7.1, page 24, and is equal to 0, 0.2, or 
0.055. The second component 
     
      
 is computed according to the rules which have been 
explicated in this appendix, where        is taxable income less child allowances. 
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Appendix B: Regression Results 
 
Table B 1: Regression results controlling for timing effects 
 
Variables RE Tobit 
log(income) 0.446*** 
 (0.008) 
log(incomet) – log(incomet-1) -0.144*** 
 (0.007) 
log(incomet+1) – log(incomet) 0.155*** 
 (0.007) 
log(price) -2.771*** 
 (0.028) 
log(pricet) – log(pricet-1) 0.702*** 
 (0.018) 
log(pricet+1) – log(pricet) -0.624*** 
 (0.018) 
No. observations 
sigma (a) 
sigma (u) 
rho 
277,495 
2.622 
1.510 
0.751 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Table reports marginal effects on the unconditional mean, evaluated at 
the means of explanatory variables. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Table B 2:  Regression results if federal state of residence is known 
 
Dependent variable: log(donations + 5) in (1), (3), (4) 
                        binary variable = 1 for donors in (2) 
 RE Tobit RE Probit  RE   FE 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(income) 0.146*** 0.076*** 0.122*** 0.025** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) 
log(price) -1.261*** -0.826*** -0.725*** -0.547*** 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.061) (0.051) 
log(churchtax) -0.0002 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Eastern states -0.197*** -0.116*** 0.043* 0.026 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.022) (0.165) 
single female  -0.199*** -0.106*** -0.041** -0.283*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.067) 
single male -0.417*** -0.223*** -0.085*** -0.222*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.032) 
married sep. ass.  -0.264*** -0.147*** -0.068 -0.275*** 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.046) (0.052) 
age 15-24  -0.672*** -0.321*** -0.204*** -0.013 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.035) (0.055) 
age 25-34 -0.444*** -0.244*** -0.222*** -0.075** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.031) 
age 35-44 -0.197*** -0.123*** -0.098*** -0.021 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.018) 
age 55-64 0.264*** 0.178*** 0.129*** -0.041** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) 
age 65 + 0.516*** 0.332*** 0.324*** -0.024 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.026) 
one child 0.027** 0.025*** -0.023* -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) 
two children 0.112*** 0.094*** -0.004 -0.025 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.026) 
three children 0.212*** 0.136*** 0.148*** 0.051 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.027) (0.042) 
> 3 children 0.255*** 0.172*** 0.228*** -0.043 
 (0.051) (0.032) (0.049) (0.069) 
No. observations 
sigma (a) 
sigma (u) 
rho 
223,920 
2.927 
1.598 
0.770 
223,920 
1.956 
--- 
0.793 
97,777 
0.996 
0.637 
0.710 
97,777 
1.146 
0.637 
0.764 
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, 
Taxpayer Panel 2001- 2006, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust errors clustered on the individual level in (3) and (4)). Time 
dummies are included in all models. Column (1) reports marginal effects on the unconditional mean, 
column (2) reports marginal effects on the probability of being a donor. Marginal effects are evaluated at the 
means of explanatory variables. 
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance. 
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Appendix C: Derivation of Loci 
 
This appendix derives the properties of the four      -loci defined in section 3.3.  
 
Locus I 
Locus I separates non-donating non-members from donating non-members. It is implicitly 
defined by 
                 
 
which can be inferred from condition (1). Obviously, Locus I is a horizontal line in the 
     -space and has an intercept with the  -axis amounting to       [       ]   . 
 
Locus II 
Locus II separates donating church members from non-donating church members. It is 
implicitly defined by 
 
                    
 
which again can be inferred from condition (1). Implicit differentiation yields 
 
  
  
 
                  
          
    
 
For     Locus I and Locus II coincide, that is, also Locus II has an intercept with the  -
axis amounting to       [       ]. 
 
Locus III 
Locus III separates non-donating church members from non-donating non-members. It is 
implicitly defined by       for         , that is, 
 
                            
 
Implicit differentiation of Locus III leads to 
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The numerator is negative as can be inferred from condition (1). The denominator is also 
negative, since   is strictly concave. Therefore, Locus III is an increasing curve in the 
     -space. The curve cannot have a positive intercept with the  -axis for    . The 
curve either springs from the origin or has a positive intercept with the  -axis. Let us first 
consider the case that Locus III springs from the origin. Since        , it follows that 
             . Furthermore, by L‟Hospital‟s rule it follows that            
    . Therefore, by continuity of Locus III it follows that Locus III is located strictly 
above the curve defined by     .  Now consider the case that Locus III has a positive 
intercept with the  -axis. In this case, Locus III is located below the curve defined by 
    . It then cannot separate between non-donating church members and non-donating 
non-members because households on Locus III would have strictly negative private 
consumption. Instead, the curve defined by      would separate between these two 
household types. However, this case is only of minor relevance as households on the curve 
defined by      have zero private consumption.  
 
Locus IV 
Locus IV separates non-donating church members from donating non-members. It is 
implicitly defined by       for      and     , that is, 
 
                                 
 
Implicit differentiation of Locus IV yields 
 
  
  
 
                
                   
    
 
The numerator again is negative. The denominator is also negative. This is because    is 
smaller than   if the household as a non-member is a donor and as a church member is not 
a donor. If    was larger than  , the household as a church member would be a donor and, 
thus, could not be located on Locus IV. Thus, also Locus IV is an increasing curve in the 
     -space. Locus IV is only defined above Locus I, because below Locus I the 
household as a non-member does not donate. Locus III and Locus IV intercept Locus I at 
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the same point and have the same slope in that point. This is because on Locus I, both 
condition (1) holds with equality for non-members and     . If Locus III is located 
below the curve defined by      , than also Locus IV is located below that curve and 
cannot separate non-donating church members from donating non-members. In this case 
again the curve      would separate between these two household types. The line of 
argument is similar to the one applied to Locus III. Whether Locus IV has an intercept with 
Locus II or not depends on the specification of   and  , and cannot be determined on a 
general level. 
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Appendix D: The Church Tax Regulations in the German Federal States 
 
The following tables display the church tax regulations in the sixteen German federal states 
for the years 2001 to 2006. In the dataset, there are tax units with missing information on 
the federal state of residence and hence we only know whether they live in a Western state 
or an Eastern state, i.e. the former German Democratic Republic. For those individuals, we 
compute the church tax liability under the regulations that would have been valid for the 
majority of church members in a certain year in either the Western federal states or the 
Eastern federal states. 
The information regarding the church tax regulations is collected from the Church Tax 
Laws of the federal states and the decrees of the various religious communities. Where this 
information could not be collected, the authors contacted the staff of the state ministries of 
finance and the staff of the churches. 
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Table D 1: Church tax in Baden-Wuerttemberg 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
see above see above see above see above see above see above 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
Catholic, Protestant 
3.5% 
Catholic, Protestant 
3.5% 
Catholic 3.5% 
Protestant 3% 
Catholic 3.5% 
Protestant 3% 
Catholic 3.5% 
Protestant 2.75% 
Catholic 3.5% 
Protestant 2.75% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant 
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Table D 2: Church tax in Bavaria 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic,  Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic,  Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic,  Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic,  Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic,  Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic,  Protestant, 
Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage    
   of taxable income 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
no no no Protestant Protestant Protestant 
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Table D 3: Church tax in Berlin 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
income tax to be assessed 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage    
   of taxable income 
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
97 
 
Table D 4: Church tax in Brandenburg 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious   
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income 
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 5: Church tax in Bremen 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
3% 3% 3% 3% 3.5% 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio  ex officio  ex officio  ex officio  ex officio  ex officio  
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 6: Church tax in Hamburg 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax  
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
see above see above see above see above see above see above 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage   
   of taxable income  
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
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Table D 7: Church tax in Hesse 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax  
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 3.60 DM 1.80 EUR 1.80 EUR 1.80 EUR 1.80 EUR 1.80 EUR 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.75% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
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Table D 8: Church tax in Lower Saxony 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed”  
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax  
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
see above see above see above see above see above see above 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 9: Church tax in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
see above see above see above see above see above see above 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
--- --- Catholic 3% Catholic 3% Catholic 3% Catholic 3% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
--- --- ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 10: Church tax in North Rhine-Westphalia 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed”  
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax  
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, 
Protestant 4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.75% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant, Jewish Protestant, Jewish Protestant, Jewish 
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Table D 11: Church tax in Rhineland-Palatinate 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Free 
religious, Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Free 
religious, Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Free 
religious, Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.75% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 12: Church tax in Saarland 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed”  
9% 
Jewish 10% 
9% 
Jewish 10% 
9% 
Jewish 10% 
9% 
Jewish 10% 
9% 
Jewish 10% 
9% 
Jewish 10% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax  
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income 
Protestant 4% Protestant 4% Protestant 4% Protestant 3.75% Protestant 3.5% Protestant 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 13: Church tax in Saxony 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed”  
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage   
   of taxable income 
3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 14: Church tax in Saxony-Anhalt 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 15: Church tax in Schleswig-Holstein 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 3.60 € 
   Levying religious   
   communities 
see above see above see above see above see above see above 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Overall income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 16: Church tax in Thuringia 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious   
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 
   Levying religious    
   communities 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage    
   of taxable income  
3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex    
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage  
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 17: Church tax regulations valid for the majority of church members in the Western federal states 
 
 
 
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, Jewish 
Catholic, 
Protestant, Free 
religious, Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Catholic, Protestant, 
Free religious, 
Jewish 
Minimum amount of 
church tax 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Amount per annum --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage  
   of taxable income  
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic, Protestant 
4% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.75% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
Catholic 4% 
Protestant 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request Upon request 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant 
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Table D 18: Church tax regulations valid for the majority of church members in the Eastern federal states 
 
  
 
Year of assessment 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Church tax rate of 
“income tax to be 
assessed” 
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
Minimum amount of 
church tax  
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
If income tax to be 
assessed > 0 
   Amount per annum 7.20 DM 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 3.60 EUR 
   Levying religious  
   communities 
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant 
Church tax ceiling 
      
   Ceiling as a percentage    
   of taxable income  
3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
   Upon request or ex  
   officio 
ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio ex officio 
Determination of shares 
for church tax in 
interreligious marriage 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
Church fee in 
interreligious marriage 
Catholic, 
Protestant 
Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant Catholic, Protestant 
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Table D 19: Church fee in interreligious marriage in 2001 
 
Fictitious taxable income in DM Church fee in DM 
60,000 – 74,999 180 
75,000 – 99,999 300 
100,000 – 124,999 540 
125,000 – 149,999 780 
150,000 – 174,999 1,080 
175,000 – 199,999 1,380 
200,000 – 249,999 1,680 
250,000 – 299,999 2,400 
300,000 – 349,999 3,120 
350,000 – 399,999 3,720 
400,000 – 499,999 4,440 
500,000 – 599,999 5,880 
600,000 and more 7,200 
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Computation of the church tax liability in inter-denominational and interreligious 
marriage 
 
This appendix shows how the church tax liability is computed in case of inter-
denominational and interreligious marriage. 
In an inter-denominational marriage, both partners belong to a religious community which 
raises church tax in the federal state of residence. The assessment base for the church tax 
liability of each partner is half the joint fictitious income tax: 
 
                                                     
 
It may be, however, that the religious community of – for example – the husband foresees 
a ceiling for the church tax while the religious community of the wife does not. In this 
case, the upper limit of the church tax liability is computed as follows: 
 
                                                                           
 
In an interreligious marriage, only one partner is member of a religious community which 
raises church tax in the federal state of residence. In this case, the church tax liability of 
this partner is computed as in the following example for the year 2006: 
 
 
 Husband Wife Total 
 
Total income revised 
by partial exempt 
income 
 
50,000 € 20,000 € 70,000 € 
Income tax liability on 
total income in case of 
single assessment 
 
13,096.25 € 2,850.06 € 15,946.31 € 
Share of total income 
tax liability 
82.1 % 17.9 %  
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The upper limit of the church tax of the husband would be determined as follows: 
 
  Husband Wife Total 
 
Total income 
revised by partial 
exempt income 
 
50,000 € 20,000 € 70,000 € 
Share of total 
income 
71.4 % 28.6 %  
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Appendix E: Tables and Figures for the Laboratory Experiment 
 
Table E 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants – Part I 
 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Gender Male 
Female 
No answer 
103 
119 
1 
46.19 
53.36 
0.45 
Age 18 – 29 
30 – 44 
45 – 59 
60 – 75  
No answer 
73 
60 
54 
34 
2 
32.74 
26.91 
24.22 
15.25 
0.90 
Family 
Status 
Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
No answer 
139 
45 
31 
6 
2 
62.33 
20.18 
13.90 
2.69 
0.90 
Children Yes 
No 
34 
189 
15.25 
84.75 
Household 
size 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
No answer 
102 
82 
21 
17 
1 
45.74 
36.77 
9.42 
7.62 
0.45 
Education University 
Gymnasium (13 years of 
education) 
Realschule (10 years of 
education) 
Hauptschule (9 years of 
education) 
Other 
No graduation 
88 
58 
 
35 
 
23 
 
17 
2 
39.46 
26.01 
 
15.70 
 
10.31 
 
7.62 
0.90 
Nationality German 
Turkish 
Italian 
Polish 
Other 
No answer 
192 
2 
3 
2 
23 
1 
86.10 
0.90 
1.35 
0.90 
10.31 
0.45 
   223 100.00 
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Table E 2: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants – Part II 
 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Household 
net income 
< 1,000 € 
1,000 – 2,000 € 
2,000 – 3,000 € 
3,000 – 4,000 € 
4,000 – 5,000 € 
> 5,000 € 
No Answer 
51 
85 
44 
13 
8 
8 
14 
22.87 
38.12 
19.73 
5.83 
3.59 
3.59 
6.28 
Religion Catholic 
Protestant 
Muslim 
Other 
No religion 
70 
71 
5 
10 
67 
31.39 
31.84 
2.24 
4.48 
30.04 
Voting 
behavior 
The Christian Democratic / 
Christian Social Union 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Greens 
The Free Democratic Party 
The Left Party 
Other 
Nonvoter 
No answer 
43 
 
49 
42 
25 
17 
9 
17 
21 
19.28 
 
21.97 
18.83 
11.21 
7.62 
4.04 
7.62 
9.42 
   223 100.00 
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Table E 3: Charitable giving habits of participants 
 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Donated before Yes 
No 
189 
34 
84.75 
15.25 
Modal charitable 
cause
1 
Child or disabled care 
Emergency aid 
Medical research 
Church and religious purposes 
Environment or animal 
protection 
Development aid 
General (e.g. Red Cross, 
charitable lotteries) 
Culture 
Politics 
Local welfare services, 
homeless persons, poverty 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects 
who did not donate before) 
46 
12 
13 
11 
32 
 
39 
20 
 
3 
2 
8 
 
37 
20.63 
5.38 
5.83 
4.93 
14.35 
 
17.49 
8.97 
 
1.35 
0.90 
3.59 
 
16.59 
Contribution 
receipt received 
Always 
Mostly 
Sometimes 
Never 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects 
who did not donate before) 
60 
36 
42 
49 
36 
26.91 
16.14 
18.83 
21.97 
16.14 
Donated in 2009
2 
Yes 
No 
67 
156 
30.04 
69.96 
   223 100.00 
1) If subjects stated that they have donated before they were asked to which charity they donated most 
frequently. If subjects gave more than one answer the charity named first was included. 
2) The average donation of the 2009 donors is 130.65 Euros. 
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Table E 4: Attitudes of participants towards society and government responsibilities 
 
 
Question / Statement Answer Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Compared with how others live 
in Germany: Do you think you 
get your fair share, more than 
your fair share, somewhat less 
or very much less than your fair 
share? 
Very much less 
Somewhat less 
Fair share 
More than fair share 
Don‟t know 
20 
61 
104 
19 
19 
8.97 
27.36 
46.64 
8.52 
8.52 
All in all, I think the social 
differences in this country are 
just. 
 
Completely agree 
Tend to agree 
Tend to disagree 
Completely disagree 
Don‟t know 
14 
65 
90 
50 
4 
6.28 
29.15 
40.36 
22.42 
1.79 
It is the responsibility of the 
state to meet everyone‟s needs, 
even in case of sickness, 
poverty, unemployment and old 
age. 
Completely agree 
Tend to agree 
Tend to disagree 
Completely disagree 
 Don‟t know 
74 
104 
35 
4 
6 
33.18 
46.64 
15.70 
1.79 
2.69 
It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the 
differences in income between 
people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes. 
 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Can‟t choose, don‟t know 
32 
73 
39 
 
48 
17 
14 
14.35 
32.74 
17.49 
 
21.52 
7.62 
6.28 
 ∑ 223 100.00 
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Figure E 1: Proceedings of the experiment 
 
1. Distribution of instructions 
2. Drawing of ID numbers 
3. Oral presentation of important instruction details 
4. Donation decision 
6. Questionnaire 
5. Collection of donations 
 
With information 
 Disabled care (low or high revenues) 
 Development aid (low or high revenues) 
 Medical research (low or high revenues) 
 Animal protection (low or high revenues) 
 
Without information 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
Note: The treatments with information are identical to the treatments without information except for the fact that in the 
donation stage subjects could choose between a small organization (with revenues between €40,000 and €300,000) and 
a large organization (with revenues between €5 million and €11 million) for each charitable purpose. 
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Appendix F: Experimental Instructions (translated from German) 
 
Welcome! 
Thank you very much for participating in our study for the analysis of consumer behavior. 
Enclosed in this folder, you find information which you need during this event. You may 
return to pages which you have already gone through at any time. Please turn pages only 
up to the next “stop-sign”. You will be asked to turn to the next page. Please read only the 
respective text and do not act until you receive specific instructions to follow the 
assignment.  
Please follow the instructions carefully. We also would like to ask you not to talk to other 
participants.  
We want to emphasize that all information which we gain from today‟s event will only be 
used to draw a comparison between the groups of participants. No individual data about 
the participants will be published or passed on.  
Shortly, we will come up to your seat and you will draw a piece of paper with a number on 
it. This number will serve as your personal identification number (ID) throughout the 
study. Please state your ID whenever you are asked to do so during the study. The ID 
ensures anonymity, as neither other participants nor we know your name or the ID that 
belongs to it. 
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 1  
For your participation in the study, you will receive 40 Euros. Shortly, we will hand out the 
money in an envelope. Then we ask you to confirm the receipt. Afterwards, you will get 
the opportunity to donate any preferred amount of money to a charitable cause. 
There is a charitable organization behind every charitable cause. The money which you, if 
any, will donate, will be completely transferred to the respective charity. We guarantee 
that this will happen lawfully and will have the transfer supervised and verified by the 
director of the notary‟s office, Dr. xxx. 
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All selected charitable organizations hold the “donation seal” by the state-approved 
German Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen 
(DZI)). This assures that the organizations act autonomously and charitably and that the 
usage of their financial means is reviewable, economical and statutory. The names of the 
individual organizations will at this point – for scientific reasons – not be mentioned. We 
guarantee that all information you receive from us regarding the organizations is true. At 
the end of the experiment, we are happy to hand to you a list of all organizations upon 
request.  
Following, we present to you four different charitable causes to which you can donate in 
the course of this study.  
The four charitable causes are: 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid  
 
[Additional part mentioned only in the Info Treatment:  
The organizations you can make a donation to do not only differ with regard to their 
charitable causes, but also their revenues, which these organizations have generated in 
2006 from donations, membership fees and government grants. For each charitable cause, 
we offer you a charitable organization with relatively small revenues between 40,000 and 
300,000 Euros and organizations with rather large revenues between 5 million Euros and 
11 million Euros.  
Therefore, we ask you, in the case you donate, to pick one of the following organizations: 
a. Medical research Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
b. Medical research Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
c. Animal protection Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
d. Animal protection Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
e. Disabled care Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
f. Disabled care Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. € 
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g. Development aid Revenues 2006: 40,000€ - 300,000€ 
h. Development aid Revenues 2006: 5 Mio. € - 11 Mio. €] 
 
We now hand out to you an envelope with the money you receive for your participation in 
our study. 
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one blue envelope  
- 40 Euros, composed of two 10 Euro-bills, one 5 Euro-bill, six 2 
Euro-coins and three 1 Euro-coins   
- one receipt.  
We now ask you to sign the receipt you find enclosed. By doing so, you confirm that you 
have received 40 Euros from ZEW for the participation in this study. We need the receipt 
for administrative purposes. Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the money. 
Your data is still handled confidentially and anonymized. We will now collect the 
receipts, the study will continue hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Now you can make a donation decision. You can decide freely and anonymously whether 
and how much money you want to give to one of the above-mentioned charitable 
organizations. The amount of money you put into the blue envelope will benefit a 
charitable cause and will be transferred completely to the respective charity after the 
experiment. You will keep the amount of money you put into the white envelope. 
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The study proceeds as follows: 
1.) Make your donation decision. 
In case of a donation, please tick the desired charitable organization on the blue envelope. 
Please note that you have to choose one of the four [in the Info treatment: eight] charities 
given. It is not possible to choose more than one charitable organization for your donation. 
Please tick only one organization if you wish to donate. If you tick more than one 
organization, unfortunately, we will not be able to transfer the donation. If you do not wish 
to donate, please do not tick any organization.  
2.) Write down your ID-number into the predefined box on the blue envelope, irrespective 
of whether you wish to donate or not.  
3.) Put the desired donation amount into the blue envelope.  
4.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep into the white envelope.  
Finally, you should have distributed 40 Euros completely to the two envelopes. Please note 
that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any desired amount 
of money into both envelopes. It is also possible to put 40 Euros completely into one 
envelope.  
5.) Seal up both envelopes.  
 
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the blue envelope. 
When we do so, please put the blue envelope into the box. Please keep the white envelope. 
We guarantee that your donation will be transferred to the charitable organization lawfully 
and have the transfer supervised and verified by the director of the notary‟s office, Dr. xxx.  
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make your 
decision as described above.  
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
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Part 2 – Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by ticking or filling out.  
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you and answer your 
question. Please do not say your question out loud and please do not talk to other 
participants. 
 
1. What is your ID-number?    __________ 
 
2. How can your marital status be described? 
O unmarried 
O married 
O divorced 
O widowed 
 
3. Please state your gender: 
O male  
O female 
 
4. What is your year of birth?  __________ 
 
5. How many people, including you, live in your household?    
       __________ 
 
6. How many children live in your household? 
O 0-3 years old    __________ 
O 4-7 years old    __________ 
O 8-12 years old    __________ 
O 13-18 years old   __________ 
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O older than 18 years   __________ 
O none     
 
7. What is your religious affiliation? 
O Catholic 
O Protestant 
O Muslim 
O Jewish 
O Buddhist 
O other:     __________ 
O no religion 
 
8. What is your highest educational achievement? 
O University/College 
O higher education entrance qualification 
O middle school 
O secondary modern school 
O other:     __________ 
O none 
 
9. What is your original nationality?  
O German 
O Turkish 
O Italian 
O Polish  
O other:     __________ 
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10. What is your first language?   __________ 
 
11. What are the monthly net earnings of your household (how much money per month is 
available for your household altogether?) 
O below 1,000 Euros 
O 1,000 – 2,000 Euros 
O 2,000 – 3,000 Euros 
O 3,000 – 4,000 Euros 
O 4,000 – 5,000 Euros 
O above 5,000 Euros 
O not specified 
 
12. Which party would you vote for if there were federal elections on the coming Sunday?  
O CDU/CSU 
O SPD 
O Bündnis 90 / The Green Party 
O FDP 
O The Left 
O Other 
O I do not vote 
O not specified 
 
14. Have you made a donation to a charitable organization before?  
O yes  O no 
 
15. To which purpose have you to date donated most often?  
____________________ 
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16. Have you already donated this year to a charitable organization? 
 O yes  O no 
 
17. If you answered question 16 with “yes”, in which month have you donated last?  
 ____________________ 
 
18. If you answered question 16 with “yes”, how much have you donated this year 
altogether?  
 _____________________ € 
 
19. Have you ever received a donation receipt for your donation?  
 O always 
 O mostly 
 O occasionally 
 O never 
 
20. Compared with how others live in Germany: Do you think you get your fair share, 
more than your fair share, somewhat less or very much less than your fair share? 
 O fair share 
 O more than fair share 
 O somewhat less than fair share 
 O very much less than fair share 
 O don‟t know 
 
21. On the whole, I find the social differences in our country just.  
 O Completely agree. 
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 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don‟t know 
 
22. The State must ensure that people can live a decent income even in illness, hardship, 
unemployment and old age.   
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don‟t know 
 
23. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.  
 O Agree strongly.  
 O Agree. 
 O Neither agree nor disagree. 
 O Disagree. 
 O Disagree strongly. 
 O Can‟t choose.  
 
-- STOP sign : Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
We would like to ask you to write down general comments regarding our study. You may 
also give reasons for your donation decision. [11 empty lines follow] 
We would like to thank you for participating in our study and wish you a nice day! Please 
remember to take the white envelope with you. 
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Appendix G: Invitation Letter Used for Recruitment of Participants (translated from 
German) 
 
The following writing was sent via private carriers to randomly selected households in the 
municipal area of Mannheim. The front page shows the logo of ZEW at the top of the 
letter, general contact information of the project manager and the following text: 
 
Ref.: Invitation to a scientific study on consumer behavior 
 
Dear Sir or dear Madam, 
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim is a non-profit-making 
research institute, which is active in the field of applied economics. At present, ZEW is 
conducting a scientific study in the range of individual consumption decisions. In order to 
carry out our scientific study, we are looking for participants. For this reason, we would 
like to invite you.  
For your participation in the study, which lasts about 60 minutes, you will receive 40 
Euros in cash. With the money, you will be able to make consumption decisions during 
the study. The money spent will be subtracted from the 40 Euros you received. If you do 
not spend any money, you will be paid out 40 Euros without deductions. In doing so, your 
decisions will be voluntary and anonymous at all times. Only the ZEW researcher team 
will know your identity, your statements will be treated with the utmost discretion and 
according to the Data Protection Act.  
Please consider the following requirements for the participation in the study: 
 registration by phone, 
 residence in Mannheim (verification with, for example, your identity card), 
 very good knowledge of the German language,  
 between 18 and 75 years old 
 arriving on time on the selected date and presenting this letter  
If you would like to take part in the study and meet the conditions mentioned above, please 
choose one of the dates listed on the next page and register by telephone. The selection of 
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participants is carried out according to scientific criteria. The event will be taking place at 
the ZEW. At the end of the event, you will receive 40 Euros in cash minus the amount 
which you have possibly spent for your personal consumption. Should you have any 
further questions, please do not hesitate to call us at 0621/1235-395 from June 29
th
 to July 
15
th
 2009, 4pm to 6pm. 
We are looking forward to welcoming you as participants in our study.  
Yours sincerely, 
XXX (project manager) 
 
The back page offers further information concerning the study: 
 
Registration: 
Please call from June 29
th
 to July 15
th 
2009 (Monday to Friday) between 4pm and 6pm at 
the following number: 0621/1235-395. Please state the date (see below) that you want to 
participate at. For the registration, your name will be noted, however, as explained above, 
will not be published or given to a third party. Please take note that with the receipt of this 
letter, you do not have any claim to participate. The selection of participants will be carried 
out according to scientific criteria.  
 
Dates (day, date, time): 
Sat, July 18
th
 2009, 9-10am Tue, July 21
st
 2009, 9-10am  
Sat, July 18
th
 2009, 11-12am Tue, July 21
st
 2009, 5-6pm  
Sat, July 18
th
 2009, 2-3pm Tue, July 21
st
 2009, 7-8pm  
Mon, July 20
th
 2009, 9-10am Wed, July 22
nd
 2009, 9-10am 
Mon, July 20
th
 2009, 5-6pm Wed, July 22
nd
 2009, 5-6pm 
Mon, July 20
th
 2009, 7-8pm      Wed, July 22
nd
 2009, 7-8pm 
 
It follows a map of the location of ZEW and general information about the ZEW taken 
from the homepage of ZEW, www.zew.de. 
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Ich versichere wahrheitsgemäß, die Dissertation bis auf die in der Abhandlung angegebene 
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